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Why the Ninth Circuit Decided Everex
as if Every Patent Licensee in America
Were Destined for Bankruptcy
Matt Siegelt

'

ABSTRACT
A patent licensee that declares bankruptcy will often
want to assign its rights under the license to another party in
exchange for cash. The Bankruptcy Code generally allows a
debtor to assign an executory contract, including a patent
license, even if it contains a provision expressly forbidding
assignment (a "no-assign" provision). But there is an exception:
The Code will defer to certain kinds of otherwise applicable
non-bankruptcy law that would normally prevent the contract
from being assigned. Two bodies of non-bankruptcy law speak
to the assignment of patent licenses. State contract law
generally permits assignment unless the license says
otherwise, while a longstanding rule of federal common law
bars assignment unless the license says otherwise. As it turns
out, the federal common-law rule is the type of non-bankruptcy
© 2004 Matt Siegel. All Rights Reserved.
Associate at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP. The ideas expressed in this
Article are the author's, and do not represent the views of Debevoise & Plimpton.
" The initial drafts of this Article were written when I was enrolled in the
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year, and the Engelberg Center on Innovation Law and Policy, which sponsors the
colloquium. I would also like to extend special thanks to Professor Barry Adler of NYU
and John DiPaolo, Executive Director for Partnership Schools at Temple University,
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rule the Code will defer to, while the state-law rule is not.
Thus, only if federal common law would govern questions of
patent license assignability outside of bankruptcy will the Code
prevent a bankrupt licensee from assigning a license with a noassign provision.
Under the Erie line of cases, whether federal common
law applies to patent license assignability questions outside of
bankruptcy depends only on whether the use of state contract
law to decide such questions would pose a "significant conflict"
with some federal policy. Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp.,
the leading case on this topic, concluded that the use of state
law would significantly conflict with federal patent policy, by
allowing patent licensees to assign their licenses even in the
face
of no-assign
provisions,
thus
depriving
the
licensors/patent-holders of much of the value of the patent
monopoly.
But the Everex court failed to account for the fact that
the use of state law only frustrates no-assign provisions when
the licensee happens to be bankrupt. Outside of the bankruptcy
context, the Bankruptcy Code does not apply, and no-assign
provisions in patent licenses are routinely enforced, whether
state contract law or federal common law is being applied.
Therefore, from the perspective of the would-be innovator (the
scientist or R&D director deciding how much effort to put into
a new project), the ex ante expected value of the patent-and
thus the incentive to innovate-may not be significantly
reduced by the use of state law. In particular, it will not be
significantly reduced if the probability is low that the eventual
licensee of the innovator's patented invention will wind up
going bankrupt. The Everex court ignored the necessity of
estimating this probability, and decided the case as if the
actual number were 100%. Other courts may be tempted to do
the same, when faced with similar facts and also in other, nonpatent-related settings.
I.

INTRODUCTION

When a technology-intensive company declares
bankruptcy, some of the bankruptcy estate's most valuable
resources are likely to be the company's patent licenses.' A
See, e.g., Donald F. Parsons, Jr. & John D. Pirnot, The Intersection of
Patent Law and Bankruptcy: What Every PractitionerShould Know, DEL. LAW., Winter
2000, at 30 ("[A] patent license may be among a debtor's most valuable assets."). A
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bankrupt licensee will often want to capitalize on its patent
licenses by assigning its rights under those contracts to the
highest bidder in exchange for payment. This can enable the
bankrupt company to better reimburse its creditors in a
liquidation scenario, or facilitate the company's reorganization
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code).'
because
so
many technology-intensive
Perhaps
companies declared bankruptcy in the wake of the stockmarket dive of 2000, bankruptcy courts in the past several
years have been confronted with cases of the sort that raise the
special legal problems associated with patent licenses.' The
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, at its October 2000
annual meeting, was already devoting a major portion of its
program to the question of whether Chapter 11 is "a
meaningful legal tool for the rehabilitation and restructuring of
high-technology companies." The treatment of patent licenses
in bankruptcy has also attracted a fair amount of scholarly
attention, both because of its practical importance in a
technology-intensive economy and because authors still have
serious doubts about exactly when a bankrupt licensee should
be allowed to assign its rights under a patent license to a third
party.'
patent license allows the company, as licensee, to use a proprietary technology at some
previously agreed royalty rate, and if the contractually determined royalty payments
are less than the expected profit one could earn by using the patented technology, the
license can be a source of significant value.
2 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000).
3 See David R. Kuney, Intellectual Property Law in Bankruptcy Court: The
Search for a More Coherent Standard in Dealing with a Debtor's Right to Assume and
Assign Technology Licenses, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 593, 593 (2001) (noting that
[tihe financial debris of the excess exuberance has now fallen into the bankruptcy
courts...").
4

id.

' See, e.g., Brett W. King, Assuming and Assigning Executory Contracts:A
History of Indeterminate "ApplicableLaw," 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 95 (1996) (discussing a
drafting paradox in the Code caused by the fact that § 365(f) explicitly permits a
trustee or debtor-in-possession to assign even if it would override "applicable law,"
while § 365(c)(1)(A) defers to certain kinds of "applicable law"); Kuney, supra note 3, at
593 (reviewing in depth the issue of patent license assignability and concluding that (i)
the post-Erie trend of applying federal common law to the issue has been implemented
somewhat blindly and will likely be reconsidered by courts, and (ii) the sensible
approach is to do away with the blanket rule and establish a new approach under
which patent licenses are presumed assignable only when assigning them would have
no material adverse impact on the licensor); Aleta A. Mills, Comment, The Impact of
Bankruptcy on Patent and Copyright Licenses, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 575 (2001)
(recommending special legislation permitting a debtor-in-possession to assume a nonexclusive patent or copyright license, but providing that it cannot assign such a license
unless the license itself so specifies); Parsons & Pirnot, supra note 1 (discussing patent
license assignment in bankruptcy as part of a practitioner's survey of issues at the
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One Code provision suggests that a bankrupt licensee
generally can assign its rights under a patent license. Indeed,
that part of the Code provides that the licensee can assign its
rights even if the license itself contains language explicitly
prohibiting assignment. (In this discussion, we will refer to
such explicit anti-assignment language in a patent license as a
"no-assign provision.") Another part of the Code, however,
creates an exception to this strong pro-assignability rule.
Under the exception, the Code will defer to certain kinds of
non-bankruptcy law that would ordinarily bar assignment of
the license in question outside of the bankruptcy context. If the
Code does defer to such non-bankruptcy law, the bankrupt
licensee will not be allowed to assign. In short, then, the Code
does not give a simple answer.
It is important to note that the Code will not defer to all
non-bankruptcy law that would ordinarily bar assignment, but
only to certain kinds of non-bankruptcy law. In particular, the
Code will not allow a bankrupt licensee to assign if the
applicable non-bankruptcy law would normally bar assignment
whether or not the license contained a no-assign provision. This
last phrase defines the subset of non-bankruptcy law that the
Code will defer to, as shown in Chart 1 below.

intersection of patent and bankruptcy law); Marie T. Reilly, The FederalInterest in the
Transfer of Patent License Rights in Bankruptcy, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 3 (2000)
(applying an economic efficiency analysis to the policy underlying the "applicable law"
exception in § 365(c)(1)(A) of the Code, which covers assignability of patent licenses in
bankruptcy); Carole A. Quinn & R. Scott Weide, Violation of the Erie Doctrine:
Application of a Rule of Federal Common Law to Issues of Patent License
Transferability, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1121 (1999) (reviewing the issue of patent
license assignability in bankruptcy, and concluding that applying federal common law
to such questions violates the Erie doctrine, because no specific federal policy or
interest dictates that the patentee should be shielded from an unwise transfer of rights
and because applying state law to the issue does not necessarily give a result at odds
with the federal rule); Daniel A. Wilson, Note, Patent License Assignment: Preemption,
Gap Filling, and Default Rules, 77 B.U. L. REV. 895 (1997) (arguing for a default rule
that patent licenses are freely assignable unless the license itself says otherwise). See
also Jessica L. Braeger, Note, Antiassignment Clauses, Mergers, and the Myth About
FederalPreemption of Application of State Contract Law to Patent License Agreements,
50 DRAKE L. REV. 639, 652-53 (2002) (asserting that the Erie doctrine requires that
state merger law trump the federal common-law presumption against patent license
assignment in the context of "assignment" of a patent license through a corporate
merger of the licensee into another company).
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Chart 1:

The Code's Treatment of the Assignability of a
Patent License with a Clear No-Assign Provision

SITUATION OUTSIDE
BANKRUPTCY
Applicable non-bankruptcy law
bars assignment only when the
license itself prohibits assignment.

Applicable non-bankruptcy law
bars assignment regardless of
whether the license prohibits
assignment.

SITUATION INSIDE
BANKRUPTCY

Code will allow assignment
by the debtor, overriding
the non-bankruptcy rule.

Code will bar assignment
by the debtor, deferring to
the non-bankruptcy rule.

Thus, the problem of whether a bankrupt licensee can
assign a patent license containing a no-assign provision
reduces, in large part, to a choice-of-law problem-a question of
which body of law applies to patent license assignability
outside of bankruptcy. If the applicable body of non-bankruptcy
law is of the sort that the Code will defer to (i.e., the sort
described in the shaded box in Chart 1), then the Code will not
allow the bankrupt licensee to assign. But if the applicable
non-bankruptcy law is not of that sort, then the Code's general
preference for assignability will prevail, and the bankrupt
licenesee will be allowed to assign.
When considering which body of non-bankruptcy law
should govern patent license assignability outside of
bankruptcy, one finds that there are only two candidates: state
contract law, and a rule of federal common law developed in
the 1850s that specifically applies to patent licenses. In
general, state contract law will permit the assignment of a
contract-including a patent license-unless the contract
explicitly states otherwise.! The federal common-law rule, by
r This is a fair simplification for the purposes of this Introduction. The
content of state law regarding contract assignability is discussed in more detail at note
34, infra. It is certainly the case that, in most states, the vast majority of contracts are
presumed assignable unless they say otherwise. Patent licenses present a difficult case.
The court in Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673 (9th
Cir. 1996)-the case whose analysis is the subject of this paper-assumed that
California state law (which is fairly typical on this point) would have permitted
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contrast, shifts the presumption in favor of non-assignability: It
prohibits the assignment of a patent license unless the license
explicitly states otherwise. Thus, the two bodies of law disagree
only in how they treat a license that is silent on the question of
assignability. But this turns out to be a very important
difference, because how a given body of non-bankruptcy law
treats such "silent" licenses is precisely what determines
whether the Code will defer to that body of law. To see this,
consider the distinction between the two bodies of law, as
illustrated by Chart 2.
Chart 2:

The Difference Between State Law and Federal
Common Law on Patent License Assignability,
Outside of the Bankruptcy Context
License says
"licensee
may assign."

License is
silent on
assignability.

State-law
rule

Assignment
permitted

Assignment
permitted

Federal
common-law
rule

Assignment
permitted

Assignment
not permitted

License says
"licensee
may not
assign."
Assignment
not
permitted
Assignment
not
permitted

As Chart 2 illustrates, outside of bankruptcy, the two
bodies of law differ only in the middle column, where the
license is silent on assignability. Chart 2 also shows that, as a
result of this difference, only the federal common-law rule bars
assignment whether the license contains a no-assign provision
or not. But this is precisely the precondition required outside of
bankruptcy in order for the Code to bar assignment by a
licensee that is in bankruptcy.7 Thus, if state contract law
applies to questions of patent license assignability outside of
bankruptcy, then inside bankruptcy the Code will override that
law, and bankrupt licensees will be allowed to assign, even in
the face of a clear no-assign provision. On the other hand, if
assignment of the license in question had it not contained a no-assign provision.
Therefore, it makes sense to assume that state law favors assignability of patent
licenses, for the purposes of assessing the logic of Everex. Otherwise we will be bogged
down in a debate with the Everex court about a state-law question that has no
definitive answer.
7 See supra Chart
1.
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federal common law governs patent license assignability
questions outside of bankruptcy, then inside bankruptcy the
Code will defer to that non-bankruptcy rule, and bankrupt
licensees will not be allowed to assign in the face of a no-assign
provision. (Indeed, they will not be allowed to assign even if the
license is silent on the issue.) In short, the fate of the debtorlicensee who is saddled with a no-assign provision depends
entirely on which of these two bodies of law applies to patent
license assignability questions outside of bankruptcy.
To determine which body of law does apply outside of
bankruptcy, one must use the analysis found in the line of
cases following Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.8 These cases, which
are a mainstay of any federal courts class in law school,
describe the limited circumstances under which courts may
supplant state law with federal common law. Patent license
assignability questions, because they are questions of contract
interpretation, will generally be governed by state contract law
unless they fall into some specific exception to Erie's broad
proscription of federal common law. If an Erie exception does
apply, federal common law will govern.
This Article will argue that there is just one circuitcourt case, Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC,
Inc.),' that has ever seriously attempted to use the Erie
doctrine to decide which body of law governs questions of
patent license assignability. As the Everex court concluded, the
Erie line of cases would allow the use of federal common law to
decide these questions only if using state contract law to decide
them would significantly conflict with some federal policy. The
Everex court went on to find that using the state-law rule
would indeed significantly conflict with a federal policy, namely
federal patent policy, because "[a]llowing free assignability-or,
more accurately, allowing states to allow free assignability-of
nonexclusive patent licenses would undermine the reward that
encourages invention . . . ."" From the Everex court's
perspective, if state contract law were to govern patent license
assignability issues outside of bankruptcy, then whenever a
licensee became bankrupt, the Code would allow the licensee to
assign, even if its license contained a no-assign provision. For
reasons explained in Part II below, overriding a no-assign
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
9 89 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1996).
10

Id. at 679.
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provision in this way will often render a patent license far less
valuable to the licensor, thus seriously diminishing the value of
the patent monopoly. That is why, in the view of the Everex
court, applying state law to questions of patent license
assignability outside of bankruptcy would significantly
undermine the federally created incentive to innovate.
This conclusion has not been immune to scholarly
critique. The most fundamental attack on Everex, offered by
Carole A. Quinn and R. Scott Weide, asserts that Congress's
persistent failure to amend the Patent Act to include even so
much as a reference to patent licenses should be regarded as a
tacit acknowledgment that there is no federal policy of
protecting the value of the patent monopoly against ordinary
variations in state contract law.11 According to Quinn and
Weide, this is especially so considering the numerous court
battles that have been fought to determine which body of law
governs the assignability of patent licenses.12 Such court cases,
in Quinn and Weide's view, should have put Congress on notice
that this was a contested issue. However, as Part V shows, this
critique relies heavily on its authors' tenuous assumptions
about the meaning of Congressional silence.
It turns out, however, that arguments such as Quinn
and Weide's are not necessary to discredit the Everex decision,
because Everex contains a serious logical error even on its own
terms-that is, even if one assumes that there is a federal
policy of protecting the value of the patent monopoly against
the normal operation of state contract law. Here is why. The
Everex court found that using state contract law to decide
questions of patent license assignability would significantly
undermine federal patent policy by substantially diminishing
the economic value of the patent. If state law were to govern
questions of patent license assignability, according to the
Everex court, then bankrupt licensees could always violate the
no-assign provisions in their patent licenses, thereby robbing
the patent holders of significant value. But in reaching this
conclusion, the court overlooked an important fact about the
" See, e.g., Quinn & Weide, supra note 5, at 1142-43 (noting that Congress
did not draft § 261 of the Patent Act to clarify the rights of a licensee and did not
include such clarification in two subsequent amendments of that section, to support the
idea that there may not be a federal policy to "always protect" exclusive governmentgranted patent rights).
12 See id. ("While Congress was aware of the various decisions regarding
patent license transferability when it enacted 35 U.S.C. § 261 in the 1952 Patent Act, it
did not amend this section to clarify the rights of a licensee.").
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world-namely, that most licensees do not end up in
bankruptcy.
The Everex court reasoned that if state law governed
questions of patent license assignability, "every licensee" would
suddenly be permitted to disregard the no-assign provision in
its patent license, depriving the licensor of his monopoly
profits." But in fact, every licensee would not be permitted to
do this. Only bankrupt licensees would. Outside of bankruptcy,
the use of state law does not frustrate no-assign provisions in
the least, because both state and federal common law lead to
the same result: If a license contains a no-assign provision, it
may not be assigned. (To confirm this, look back at the rightmost column in Chart 2.) Only in the event of licensee
bankruptcy does the use of state law undermine the license's
no-assign provision. And licensee bankruptcy may, in fact, be
quite rare.
Certainly, from the perspective of the licensor whose
licensee has already declared bankruptcy, the use of state law
to decide questions of patent license assignability significantly
reduces the value of the patent monopoly. But that is not the
perspective federal patent policy cares about. Federal patent
policy, by definition, is concerned only with the perspective of
the would-be innovator, e.g., the scientist in her laboratory
trying to decide how much effort to put into her next research
project. From this person's perspective, the use of state law to
decide questions of patent license assignability might not
significantly diminish the expected value of the patent. It all
depends on the ex ante expected probability that the
innovator's future licensee will go bankrupt. Only if the
expected probability of licensee bankruptcy is fairly high will
the use of state contract law significantly impair the ex ante
expected value of the patent, and thus the incentive to
innovate.
Thus, if a court wishes to opine on whether the use of
state law to decide questions of patent license assignability
"significantly" reduces the patent's value from the ex ante
perspective, the court must necessarily weigh in on the ex ante
probability that a patent licensee will go bankrupt, which is a
purely empirical question. The Everex court never took a
"' See Everex, 89 F.3d at 679 (remarking that, if states are permitted to allow
free assignability of patent licenses, "every licensee would become a potential
competitor" of the licensor in the market for rights to make, sell, or use the technology).
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position on the probability of licensee bankruptcy. Indeed, it
never even mentioned that such a determination might be
relevant. And Everex's scholarly critics have likewise ignored
this shortcoming of the court's opinion. The point of this Article
is not to argue that the Everex court's conclusion was
necessarily wrong, but to show that one cannot possibly know
whether it was wrong or not without some notion of the
probability of licensee bankruptcy. This observation should be
uncontroversial, and yet it seems to have been ignored by both
the Everex court and its critics.
Part II of this Article explains the compelling economic
reasons why patent licensors often include no-assign provisions
in their licenses. Part III discusses § 365(f) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which gives a bankrupt licensee the right to assign its
license to a third party in most cases, even when the license
contains a clear no-assign provision. It then introduces §
365(c)(1) of the Code, which creates an exception to that rule in
certain circumstances (as shown in the gray box in Chart 1).
Based on these two provisions of the Code, Part III shows that
if state contract law applies to questions of patent license
assignability outside of bankruptcy, then inside bankruptcy the
debtor-licensee will be allowed to assign, notwithstanding a noassign provision, but if federal common law applies to those
questions, the debtor-licensee will not be allowed to assign.
Thus, whether or not a bankrupt licensee may assign in spite of
a no-assign provision boils down to an Erie analysis.
Part IV describes the two federal circuit cases that have
attempted this Erie analysis, and concludes that only one of
them, Everex, supplies an intelligible argument that future
courts might be tempted to follow. Part V reviews the two main
critiques of Everex in the existing literature, and shows that
one of them, even if correct, would be confined to the facts of
Everex and would not undermine its basic legal conclusion,
while the other relies on its authors' subjective, and eminently
assailable, imputation of meaning to Congressional silence.
Part VI argues for a more robust critique of Everex: a
criticism of the Everex court's failure to take a position on the
probability of licensee bankruptcy. The need for such an
empirical analysis, which the Everex court overlooked, is not an
entirely new idea. In fact, the Supreme Court made this same
point, in a- completely different context, in Robertson v.
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Wegmann," also discussed in Part VI. Part VII then
anticipates, and rejects, a few reasons why one might doubt
this Article's main criticism of Everex. Finally, Part VIII
sketches out the analysis that the Everex court should have
used and that future courts might employ when confronted
with similar questions. It also observes that this Article's basic
argument can apply to many Erie analyses unrelated to
patents or patent licenses. Specifically, the same argument can
apply whenever a court is trying to decide whether the
application of state law "significantly conflicts" with a federal
policy, and the facts before the court belong to some special
subset of cases in which state law does impair the federal
policy. A court in this situation will often be tempted to analyze
the "significant conflict" standard only over this special subset
of cases, as the Everex court did. Instead, the court should
always ask whether the application of state law significantly
conflicts with the relevant federal policy overall, measuring the
federal policy over the entire range of circumstances to which it
applies, not just over the special subset. Focusing narrowly on
fact patterns in which state law injures federal policy, and
forgetting about the many situations where it does not, can
lead to an improper proliferation of federal common law. In
conclusion, Part VIII summarizes some of the reasons why we
may want to resist the temptation to create "too much" federal
common law.
II.

THE

ECONOMIC

IMPORTANCE

OF

PATENT

LICENSE

ASSIGNABILITY

Before plunging into the legal analysis, we should first
try to understand the practical context in which it arises. The
licensing of patents is a common occurrence. Some companies
(and people) are good at discovering new technologies, while
others excel at applying those technologies in the marketplace.
Rather than forcing every patentee to sell the fruits of her own
research, the law allows innovators to license their proprietary
technologies to the companies that will best employ them.
A patent license can be made explicitly assignable by its
terms, can explicitly forbid assignment, or can be silent on the
issue of assignability. This last possibility-contractual
silence-raises interesting questions, but it will not be our
14 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
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primary focus here because the licenses that cover the most
valuable technologies are usually drafted by expert patent
lawyers who are unlikely to overlook the important issue of
assignability.15 We are left, then, with those licenses that are
explicitly assignable, and those that contain a no-assign
provision. If a patent license is assignable by its terms, the
legal problem at the heart of this Article disappears. Licenses
that are explicitly assignable outside of bankruptcy remain
assignable under the Code, and the thorny questions raised by
§ 365(c)(1) never arise. But in fact, companies that license their
patented technologies often have good reasons to prefer that
the licenses not be assignable, and therefore most valuable
patent licenses contain no-assign provisions.16
This occurs for two reasons. First, when a license is nonexclusive-i.e., when the licensor retains the right to license its
technology to other licensees-the licensor will often want to
insure that the technology cannot be assigned so that it can
protect its ability to charge high royalties to subsequent
licensees. If the first licensee could freely assign its rights to
others, then anyone else wishing to use the technology could
purchase it from either the licensor or the first licensee. The
resulting competition between the two would enable the wouldbe licensee to negotiate a lower royalty rate than would have
been possible had he been negotiating with the licensor alone.17
Second, whether or not the license is exclusive, the licensor
15 Part VII.B briefly considers how this paper's analysis might be extended to

include licenses that are silent on the question of assignability.
16 In fact, such provisions often say that the license can be assigned, but only
with the consent of the licensor. Since we are concerned here with situations in which
the assignment robs the licensor of value--and where the licensor would therefore not
typically agree to an assignment-the possibility of such mutually agreeable
assignment does not change anything in our analysis.
Note also that even if a license does contain a no-assign provision, if its
value to some third-party firm is sufficiently high, the licensee can try to "assign" the
license to that firm by merging with the firm or being taken over by it. For an example
of this, see PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus., 597 F.2d 1090 (6th Cir. 1979). Of course,
this sort of "assignment by merger" will happen only in extreme cases. See Braeger,
supra note 5, for a discussion of corporate takeovers of this type.
17 See, e.g., Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673,
679 (9th Cir. 1996). The court observed that if one allows a non-exclusive patent license
to be assignable:
[A] party seeking to use the patented invention could either seek a license
from the patent holder or seek an assignment of an existing patent license
from a licensee. In essence, every licensee would become a potential
competitor with the licensor-patent holder in the market for licenses under
the patent [.
Id. at 679. (emphasis in original).
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may insist on a no-assign provision to protect its competitive
advantage. A patent-holder frequently uses its patented
technology to achieve an advantage in its own industry, and it
may be willing to license the technology only to firms in other
industries, which cannot possibly use the technology to
compete in the licensor's home market. Without a no-assign
provision, the licensee could turn around and assign the license
to the licensor's main competitor, destroying the licensor's
competitive advantage."
Having described the economic context in which issues
of patent license assignability arise, we should also note that
the treatment of such issues by bankruptcy courts has practical
consequences far beyond the bankruptcy context. For example,
suppose that courts interpret the Code to permit assignment by
bankrupt licensees. In that case, whenever a would-be licensor
and licensee are negotiating the terms of a license, the licensor
will demand higher royalty payments to compensate it for the
risk that the licensee might someday go bankrupt, thereby
gaining the right to assign the license. It would be as if the
licensor were forced to sell the licensee a kind of "bankruptcy
insurance," by awarding the licensee the valuable right to
assign its license only in those instances where the licensee has
declared bankruptcy. If the two parties think the chance of an
eventual bankruptcy is high, then the licensor will insist on a
high premium for this bankruptcy insurance (i.e., high royalty
payments), and a license that would otherwise have been
signed might be rendered jointly disadvantageous to the two
parties, such that no deal can be struck at any price. On the
other hand, if licensee bankruptcy appears very unlikely (or if
it appears that the harm to the licensor from the licensee's
assignment of its patent rights would be slight), then the
licensee will pay only a small premium for its bankruptcy
insurance, and the overall effect on economic efficiency will be
negligible." The point is this: The expected probability of
licensee bankruptcy will affect the royalty rates paid by all
licensees, even those who never end up in bankruptcy-just as,

18

This is what occurred in Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Kelley Co., 465 F.2d 1303

(7th Cir. 1972). See also Mills, supra note 5, at 580 ("When the debtor is a licensee of a
nonexclusive patent or copyright license, the licensor's central concern is that the
license may be transferred to a competitor or some other entity that the licensor would
not have contracted with.").
19 I thank John DiPaolo for pointing out that
the insurance metaphor was
better than the "lottery" metaphor.
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for example, a person's expected probability of contracting
emphysema will affect his health insurance premiums even if
he never winds up getting the disease. Thus, the treatment of
patent licenses in bankruptcy is not just a "bankruptcy issue."
Its economic effects spill over into the non-bankruptcy world.

III.

THE DIFFERING EFFECTS OF APPLYING STATE CONTRACT
LAW AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW OUTSIDE OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CONTEXT

The statutory analysis of whether patent licenses are
assignable by a bankrupt licensee begins with §§ 365(a) and
365(f) of the Code. These sections provide that, in a
bankruptcy, the debtor may assign all of its executory
contracts, including patent licenses, even when those contracts
contain clear no-assign provisions." Specifically, § 365(a) says
that the trustee or debtor-in-possession2 1 "may assume or reject
any executory contract ... of the debtor."22 When a contract is
assumed under § 365(a), the debtor and any other parties to
the contract continue to be bound by it just as if no bankruptcy
had occurred.23 Section 365(f) provides as follows: "Except as
provided in . . . [§ 365(c)], notwithstanding a provision in an
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, or in
applicable law, that prohibits, restricts, or conditions the
20 Section 365 of the Code never mentions patent licenses by name. It speaks
of "[e]xecutory contracts and unexpired leases" held by the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 365

(2004). But the term "executory contract" has routinely been construed to include non-

exclusive patent licenses. See, e.g., Everex, 89 F.3d at 677 (holding that a patent license
was an "executory contract"-i.e., one in which substantial performance remained due
on both sides-because the licensor owed "significant continuing performance" to

licensee, in that the licensor "must continue to refrain from suing [the licensee] for
infringement

. . ."). See generally Vern

Countryman, Executory Contracts in

Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973) (giving the classic definition of
"executory contract").
There is considerable doubt about whether an exclusive license would be
regarded as an executory contract for the purposes of § 365. Particularly, if such a
license prevented the licensor from using the technology in question, a bankruptcy
court might find that it more closely resembled an outright transfer of the patent than
an executory contract. Kuney, supra note 3, at 598. In that case, the patent would
simply be treated as property of the debtor, and § 365 would not apply. Accordingly, the
present discussion can be applied reliably only to non-exclusive patent licenses.
21 For the sake of simplicity, this Article will refer to the "debtor" as the
one
who assumes or assigns a contract, even though it is technically the trustee or debtorin-possession that does so.
22 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2000).
23 The debtor may even assume a contract it has breached, so long as
it
promptly cures any defaults and gives "adequate assurance" that it will perform on the
contract in the future. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1), (b)(1)(A) (2000).
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assignment of such contract . . . , the [debtor] may assign [a
contract it has assumed under § 365(a)] . .. ,"24 so long as the
debtor gives the court "adequate assurance" that the assignee
will perform.25
Those unfamiliar with the Code may find this
surprising. A bankrupt company not only has the right to
continue its contractual relationship on the terms it enjoyed
before declaring bankruptcy, but it may also assign its contract
rights and obligations to the highest bidder, even if the
contract itself explicitly prohibits assignment. This heavyhanded rule has been explained as a way of allowing debtors to
"monetize" their valuable contract rights, so that creditors can
recover more of what they are owed and debtors have a better
chance at a successful reorganization." In any case, it does
amount to a transfer of wealth from one contract party to
another, triggered by the latter's bankruptcy."
As we saw in Part I, the Code contains an important
exception to this rule of ignoring no-assign provisions in
contracts. Section 365(c)(1) says that if some otherwise
applicable body of non-bankruptcy law would have barred
assignment of a contract outside of bankruptcy-and would
have barred such assignment regardlessof whether the contract
contained a no-assign provision-then the Code will defer to
this body of non-bankruptcy law. In other words, in such cases
the Code will bar assignment of the contract by the debtor,
whether the contract contains a no-assign provision or not, just
as the non-bankruptcy law would have done.28 (See Chart 1
11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1) (2000). See also 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(2)(A) (2000)
(providing that a trustee may assign executory contract only if he assumes it in
accordance with § 365).
25 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(2)(B) (2000).
26 See, e.g., Reilly, supra note 5, at 3 ("Under nonbankruptcy
law, whether
the licensor can block a proposed transfer of patent license rights depends on the terms
of the license. . . . Bankruptcy law, however, specifically invalidates restrictions or
prohibitions on transfer in order to maximize the value of the rights for the benefit of
the estate."); Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Limitations on Assumption and Assignment of
Executory Contracts by "ApplicableLaw," 31 N.M. L. REV. 299, 300-01 (2001) (asserting
that courts, as well as most debtors and creditors, prefer reorganization to liquidation,
and that the Code must give the debtor the ability to control the disposition of its prebankruptcy contracts to help assure a successful reorganization).
27 Essentially, because of this rule, every contract that contains
a no-assign
provision implicitly contains a "bankruptcy insurance" policy of the sort discussed in
Part II.
28 Section
365(f), which invalidates no-assign provisions, specifically
recognizes § 365(c) as an exception. Section 365(c) reads as follows:
§ 365. Executory contracts and unexpired leases
24
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above for an illustration of the type of non-bankruptcy law to
which the Code will defer.)
The idea behind § 365(c)(1) is subtle, but sensible. If the
ordinarily bar
law would
non-bankruptcy
applicable
assignment only when the contract contained a no-assign
provision, then it would merely be enforcing the language of
the contract. If the Code were to defer to such non-bankruptcy
law, bankrupt licensees could always point to state contract
law, which routinely enforces no-assign provisions, as an
applicable body of non-bankruptcy law that would ordinarily
bar assignment. The Code would then be forced to bar
assignment in virtually every case, and the exception would
have swallowed the rule. This is why the Code cannot defer to
non-bankruptcy law that merely enforces contractual no-assign
provisions.' On the other hand, if the applicable body of nonbankruptcy law would bar assignment regardless of whether
the contract contained a no-assign provision, then whoever
wrote that law (Congress, the state legislature, etc.) must have
(c) The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease
prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties,
if(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the
debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting
performance from or rendering performance to an entity
other than the debtor or the debtor in possession, whether
or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts
assignment of rights or delegation of duties; and
(B) such party does not consent to such assumption or
assignment....
11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (2000).
Note the repetition of the clause "whether or not such contract or lease
prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties." 11 U.S.C. § 365(c),
(c)(1)(A) (2000). The second appearance of this clause, in section 365(c)(1)(A), indicates
that the Code will defer only to applicable non-Code law that bars assignment in a
contract-blind way-i.e., whether or not the contract contains a no-assign provision.
Section 365 is a confusingly drafted provision, and the discussion of it here
has intentionally ignored certain unsettled debates about its meaning, which would
take us far from the topic of this Article and are not essential to it. In particular, there
are still doubts about (i) whether the words "assume or assign" in the first line of
§365(c) literally mean that whenever the debtor would be prohibited from assigning an
executory contract under this provision, it would also be prohibited from assuming that
contract; and (ii) the different meanings of the term "applicable law" as it is used in
§365(c)(1)(A) and § 365(f)(1), respectively. See, e.g., King, supra note 5; Kuney, supra
note 3; Mills, supra note 5; Pulley Radwan, supra note 26; Reilly, supra note 5. See also
Ford Motor Co. v. Claremont Acquisition Corp. (In re Claremont Acquisition Corp.), 186
B.R. 977, 980-84 (C.D. Cal. 1995), for a detailed discussion of point (ii) above.
29 See Reilly, supra note 5, at 22 (noting that the second "whether or not"
clause in § 365(c) excludes from "applicable law" rules of contract interpretation that
disallow assignment simply because the parties chose to disallow assignment).
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done so for overarching policy reasons, beyond the mere desire
to enforce private agreements. This is the sort of nonbankruptcy law to which the Code will defer. Thus, the Code
defers to "policy-based" non-bankruptcy rules that bar
assignment, but not to rules that bar assignment just to
enforce privately negotiated no-assign provisions.
Once one understands this aspect of § 365(c), it becomes
clear that the central practical question of this Articlewhether a no-assign provision will be enforced, or ignored, in
bankruptcy-can be answered only by looking at the body of
law that would ordinarily apply to questions of patent license
assignability outside of the bankruptcy context. In fact, there
are only two candidates. First there is state contract law, which
governs questions of contract assignability generally, along
with almost all aspects of patent license construction other
than assignability questions."° Second, as noted in Part I, there
is a very old rule of federal common law, which was designed
specifically to supplant state contract law on questions
concerning the assignability of patent licenses. 1
For the moment, let us put aside the question of which
of these two bodies of law actually applies to questions of
patent license assignability outside of bankruptcy. The answer
is unclear. Instead, we will do a brief thought experiment, and
See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 661-62 (1969) (finding that
construction of a licensing agreement on a technology that was under review by the
Patent and Trademark Office when the agreement was signed, and that was later
covered by a patent, was "solely a matter of state law . . ."); Luckett v. Delpark, Inc.,
270 U.S. 496 (1926) (noting that, in general, a suit by a patentee for any remedy in
respect of the contract permitting use of the patent is not a suit under the U.S. patent
laws); Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir.
1996) ("The construction of a patent license is generally a matter of state contract law.
. . except where state law 'would be inconsistent with the aims of federal patent
policy.") (quoting Lear, 395 U.S. at 673); McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d
917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Whether express or implied, a license is a contract 'governed
by ordinary principles of state contract law.'") (quoting Power Lift, Inc. v. Weatherford
Nipple-Up Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 1989)); Reilly, supra note 5, at 13
("Since Erie v. Tompkins, courts have treated construction of patent licenses as matter
of state contract law, except where state law would be inconsistent with the aims of
federal patent policy.").
31 See Everex, 89 F.3d at 679 (describing the recent history of
the federal
rule). See also Troy Iron & Nail Factory v. Coming, 55 U.S. 193, 216 (1852) (setting
forth the rule 153 years ago); Bowers v. Lake Superior Contracting & Dredging Co.,
149 F. 983, 986 (8th Cir. 1906) ("A license to use a patented invention that does not
contain words importing assignability is a grant of a mere personal right to the licensee
which does not pass to his heirs or representatives and which cannot be transferred to
another without the expressed consent of the licensor."); Reilly, supra note 5 at 4
("Courts have developed a federal common law default rule that governs the
transferability of patent license rights.").
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consider both possibilities. Here is a second copy of Chart 2, as
a reminder of the content of state law and federal common law
concerning patent license assignability:
Chart 2 (Again): The Difference Between State Law and Federal
Common Law on Patent License Assignability,
Outside of the Bankruptcy Context
License says
"licensee
may assign."

License is
silent on
assignability.

State-law
rule

Assignment
permitted

Assignment
permitted

Federal
common-law
rule

Assignment
permitted

Assignment
not permitted

License says
"licensee
may not
assign."
Assignment
not
permitted
Assignment
not
permitted

First, imagine a world in which questions of patent
license assignability are governed by state contract law. In
such a world, what will happen when a bankrupt licensee asks
the bankruptcy court for permission to assign its license,
notwithstanding a no-assign provision? Initially the judge will
look to the Code, where she will find § 365(f), setting forth the
general rule that the debtor may assign the license, regardless
of the no-assign provision. But the judge will also have to
consider § 365(c)(1), which carves out an exception to the proassignability rule of § 365(f). As discussed above," this
exception applies only where the applicable non-bankruptcy
law would ordinarily bar assignment regardless of whether the
license contained a no-assign provision. Here, by assumption,
the "applicable law" is state contract law, and in most states,
contract law principles would bar assignment if the license
contained a no-assign provision but would permit assignment if
it did not.3 In other words, state law construes contractual
silence in favor of assignability. 4 Thus, it cannot be said that
32 See
33

supra Chart 1 and accompanying text.

See supra Chart 2.

34 The Everex court presumed that, outside of bankruptcy, state contract law
would allow assignment of a patent license that did not contain a no-assign provision.
In fact, as David Kuney has suggested, a better analysis of state law might have led to
the conclusion that the license at issue in Everex should have been presumed nonassignable. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text. It is difficult to say how state
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the applicable non-bankruptcy law bars assignment regardless
of whether the license contains a no-assign provision because,
in fact, state law gives different results depending on whether
the license contains a no-assign provision, as illustrated in
Chart 2. Therefore, the condition of § 365(c)(1) is not met.
Section 365(f) controls, and the Code will allow the debtor to
assign. 5
As the second step in our thought experiment, imagine a
world in which questions of patent license assignability are
governed by federal common law, as shown in the bottom row
of Chart 2. A line of federal court opinions dating back to 1852
established the rule that patent licenses, unlike most other
contracts, should be presumed to be non-assignable absent
some explicit contractual language to the contrary."6 Thus, in
the federal common law world, if a bankruptcy court were faced
with a patent license containing a no-assign provision, it would
be clear to the court that outside of bankruptcy the federal rule
would have barred assignment of that license with or without
the no-assign provision. In other words, outside of bankruptcy,
courts would treat the issue of patent license assignability under state contract law in
any given case, largely because patent license assignability has typically been
controlled by federal common law (due in large part to opinions like Everex, which this
Article argues may have been wrongly decided). In any event, one state supreme court
did reach this issue under state law, and concluded that the license in question should
be presumed assignable. Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier, 308 P.2d 732, 740-41
(Cal. 1957). For the purposes of this Article, we assume only that the Dopplmaier
decision was not aberrant. That is, we assume that a significant number of patent
licenses (if not all of them) would be presumed assignable under state contract law,
absent any contractual language to the contrary. The Everex decision would certainly
apply to those licenses; so the argument of this Article would be relevant to them as
well.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that contractual rights
(such as the right to use a patented technology) can generally be assigned where such
assignment is not precluded by the contract, except in situations where transferring
the rights from assignor to assignee "would materially change the duty of the obligor,
or materially increase the burden or risk imposed on him by his contract, . . . or
materially reduce its value to him... ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §317(2)
(1979). As Marie T. Reilly points out, this language begs the question of what happens
under state law when the assignment of a license to a second licensee would result in
the very same stream of royalties to the licensor, but would deprive the licensor of the
even larger royalty stream it could have gotten by issuing a new license to the second
licensee, with no competition from the first licensee. See Reilly, supra note 5, at 8 ("In
particular, [the Restatement] does not directly address whether an objecting party is
entitled to enjoin transfer in order to capture an opportunity to profit," as opposed to
an outright loss.).
'5 See Reilly, supra note 5, at 18-22 (noting that whether the Code will defer
to a non-bankruptcy bar on assignability depends entirely on what the non-bankruptcy
rule would do if the contract were (hypothetically) silent on the question of
assignability).
36 See Troy Iron & Nail, 55 U.S. at 216; see generally supra note 31.
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one could have scratched out the no-assign language and it
wouldn't have made any difference, since the federal rule would
have barred assignment in both the right-most and center
columns of Chart 2. Therefore, the condition of § 365(c)(1) is
met. The Code will defer to the federal rule that applies outside
of bankruptcy, and the bankrupt licensee will not be allowed to
assign.
Our thought experiment is now complete, and the
conclusion is clear. If state common law applies to questions of
patent license assignability outside of bankruptcy, then a
bankrupt licensee may assign its license, notwithstanding a noassign provision. But if federal common law governs those
questions, a bankrupt licensee may not assign, whether the
contract contains a no-assign provision or not. Therefore,
whether a bankrupt licensee may assign its patent license boils
down to a choice-of-law question: Does state contract law
govern questions of patent license assignability outside of
bankruptcy, or does federal common law govern them?
IV.

THE CHOICE-OF-LAW QUESTION

A.

The Erie Doctrine

The federal common-law rule for questions of patent
license assignability was created by the Supreme Court in the
37 In the
1852 case of Troy Iron & Nail Factory v. Corning.
second half of the nineteenth century and early decades of the
twentieth, federal courts consistently used this rule to
determine whether patent licenses could be assigned.' But the
scope of federal common law in general was dramatically
narrowed in 1938 by the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.' On its face, Erie
forbade the creation of federal common law (i.e., judge-made
law), except when the federal courts were interpreting federal
statutes or the Constitution.' Beyond that, creating federal
common law exceeded the constitutional powers of the federal
37 55 U.S. 193 (1852).

See, e.g., id. at 216; Oliver v. Rumford Chem. Works, 109 U.S. 75, 83
(1883); Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226, 234 (1886); Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150
U.S. 193, 195-96 (1893); Bowers v. Lake Superior Contracting & Dredging Co., 149 F.
983, 986 (8th Cir. 1906).
39

304 U.S. 64 (1938).

"

Id. at 78.
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courts."

Thus,

federal

common-law

rules

of

contract

interpretation, such as the rule pertaining to patent license
assignability, should have been nullified by Erie.
However, the Supreme Court has re-expanded the scope
of federal common law considerably by carving out a number of
exceptions to Erie, and today the exact boundaries of the
federal courts' power to create common law are somewhat
unclear." The specific question of whether federal common law
should apply to questions of patent license assignability has
come up in four federal circuit court opinions since Erie, and on
all four occasions the courts decided that the federal commonlaw rule did still apply. But these four cases hardly represent
an overpowering tide of opinion. The California State Supreme
Court has come down on the other side, holding that in the
post-Erie period, questions of patent license assignability
should be governed by state law, not federal common law. 3 And
of the four federal circuit decisions on the topic, only twoUnarco Industries v. Kelley" and Everex Systems Inc. v.
Cadtrak Corp.4 -even attempted to do an Erie-style analysis of
the proper scope of federal common law. The other two
opinions, Rock-Ola v. Filben' and PPG Industries v. Guardian
Industries,7 embraced the federal common-law rule only in
dicta and supported their conclusions by simply citing prior
federal cases, without independently analyzing whether it was
proper to apply the federal common-law rule in the wake of
Erie. Moreover, the only U.S. Supreme Court decisions cited in
these two opinions were decided prior to Erie, and so could
hardly be expected to embody the post-Erie standard. Let us
examine in turn the two more substantial post-Erie decisions:
Unarco and Everex.

41

id.

See generally 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 4514, nn.5-38 and accompanying text (2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2003)
(describing existence of myriad post-Erie instances of federal common law).
Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier, 308 P.2d 732, 739 (Cal. 1957).
Three of the four post-Erie federal circuit court cases were decided after Dopplmaier,
and it may be that the California Supreme Court, if confronted with the issue today,
would find those three decisions persuasive. Still, the Dopplmaeier decision does
remain good law in California, and the fact that its outcome differed from that of the
federal circuit courts at least gives us reason to believe that the issue is a disputed one.
465 F.2d 1303, 1305 (7th Cir. 1972).
45 89 F.3d 673, 678 (9th Cir. 1996).
168 F.2d 919, 922 (8th Cir. 1948).
4
97 F.2d 1090, 1093 (6th Cir. 1979).
42
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Unarco

The Unarco court supported its decision to embrace
federal common law by citing Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Co.,
a Supreme Court case decided four years after Erie, in which
the Court carved out an exception to Erie's rejection of federal
common law.4 The Unarco court relied on the following (rather
cumbersome) passage from Sola:
[The Erie doctrine is] "inapplicable to those areas of judicial decision
within which the policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of
federal statutes that legal relations which they affect must be
deemed governed by federal law having its source in those statutes,
rather than by local law." 9

The Unarco court found that questions of patent license
assignability did fall into this exception to Erie, and must
therefore be controlled by federal common law.' As the Unarco
court put it,
When [a] .

.

. person ...

desires to license or relinquish any part of

the patent monopoly, such person is utilizing the monopoly of rights
intended by the framers of the Constitution and the legislation of
Congress to reward invention and originality. This monopoly
conferred by federal statute as well as the policy perpetuating this
monopoly, so affects the licensing of patents, and the policy behind
such licensing is so intertwined with the sweep of federal statutes,
that any question with respect thereto must be governed by federal
law. 51

Therefore, the Unarco court concluded, "the question of
assignability of a patent license is a specific policy of federal
patent law dealing with federal patent law.""2
But Unarco's invocation of Sola was misplaced. Based
on the cumbersome passage quoted two paragraphs above, the
Sola Court clearly permitted the creation of federal common
law only in circumstances where a whole "area[] of judicial
decision" was densely populated by federal statutes directed
toward a particular policy goal, so that the "legal relations"
affected by those statutes had to be controlled by federal law.'
See Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942); Erie, 304 U.S.
64, 78 (1938).
49 Unarco, 465 F.2d at 1306 (quoting Sola, 317 U.S. at
176).
50 Unarco,465 F.2d at 1306.
51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Sola, 317 U.S. at 176.
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But this cannot possibly justify the Unarco decision. Certainly,
the law pertaining to the federally created patent monopoly is
an "area[] of judicial decision" that could be considered
"dominated by the sweep of federal statutes"-namely, the
Patent Act. But if that is a basis for allowing the creation of
federal common law under Sola, then federal common law
must apply to all "legal relations" affected by the Patent Act,
for that is what the cumbersome quotation from Sola says. This
means that federal law would have to eclipse state contract law
on every conceivable issue of patent license construction, not
just issues of assignability. But in fact, courts routinely treat
almost every aspect of patent license construction other than
assignability as a matter of state, not federal, law." As the
Everex court noted twenty-four years after Unarco, Unarco's
conclusion that Sola requires "any question with respect" to
"the licensing of patents" to be governed by federal law "seems
insupportably broad given the general rule that most questions
with respect to the construction of patent licenses are governed
by state law. " '
C.

Everex

Because the Unarco decision contains this fundamental
flaw, the Everex case currently stands as the one circuit court
decision in which the court undertook a meaningful Erie
analysis of the patent license assignability issue. Due to its
unique status, Everex is likely to serve as the jumping-off point
for federal courts confronted with patent license assignability
questions in the future.
In the events leading up to Everex, a licensee had
declared bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy trustee wanted to
assign the license to a third party, even though the license
4Id.

a As Quinn and Weide have noted:
The Supreme Court has long held that suits brought on a contract in which a
patent is the subject-matter, and which generally do not involve the validity
or construction of a patent, are not cases under the patent laws and are
within the jurisdiction of the state courts. In addition, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit routinely addresses other issues of
contract interpretation with state law.
Quinn & Weide, supra note 5, at 1143-44. See also sources cited supra note 30.
Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th
Cir. 1996). See also Kuney, supra note 3, at 601 ("The notion that 'any question' with
respect to the assignment of a patent is a matter of federal common law [, as suggested
by the Unarco court,] is debatable, and likely to be wrong.").
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explicitly prohibited assignment. 7 The court concluded (just as
we did in Part III) that the question of whether the license
could be assigned boiled down to a non-bankruptcy choice-oflaw question: whether, outside of bankruptcy, issues of patent
license assignability are governed by federal common law.' The
Everex court's effort to answer that question is well
summarized in a single paragraph from its opinion:
The fundamental policy of the patent system is to "encourag[e] the
creation and disclosure of new, useful, and non-obvious advances in
technology and design" by granting the inventor the reward of "the
exclusive right to practice the invention for a period of years."
Allowing free assignability-or, more accurately, allowing states to
allow free assignability--of nonexclusive patent licenses would
undermine the reward that encourages invention because a party
seeking to use the patented invention could either seek a license
from the patent holder or seek an assignment of an existing patent
license from a licensee. In essence, every licensee would become a
potential competitor with the licensor-patent holder in the market
for licenses under the patents. And while the patent holder could
presumably control the absolute number of licenses in existence
under a free-assignability regime, it would lose the very important
ability to control the identity of its licensees. Thus, any license a
patent holder granted--even to the smallest firm in the product
market most remote from its own-would be fraught with the danger
that the licensee would assign it to the patent holder's most serious
competitor, a party whom the patent holder itself might be
absolutely unwilling to license.9

"Thus," the court concluded, "federal law governs the
assignability of patent licenses because of the conflict between
federal patent policy and state laws, such as California's
[contract law], that would allow assignability."' Having decided
that the federal common-law rule should govern questions of
patent license assignability generally, the Everex court easily
concluded that the bankrupt licensee in question should not be
allowed to assign its license to a third party because of §
365(c)(1) of the Code, which defers to the federal common-law
rule, as we saw in Part III.

57 Everex,

89 F.3d at 674-75. The license at issue was non-exclusive, so it was
treated as an executory contract under the Code. See supra note 20.
5 Id. at 677.
9 Id. at 679 (citations omitted).
Id. (emphasis added).
61 Id. at 680.
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WHAT THE PRESENT ARGUMENT ADDS TO THE EXISTING
CRITIQUES OF EVEREX

The considerable scholarship on the treatment of patent
licenses in bankruptcy has included at least two salient
critiques of Everex, one articulated by David Kuney, the other
by Carole Quinn and R. Scott Weide.
A.

David Kuney's Critique

In a 2001 article, Kuney argues that the Everex court
may have simply gotten the state-law rule wrong as applied to
the patent license under consideration. 2 If California contract
principles would ordinarily have regarded the relevant patent
license as being non-assignable even without the no-assign
provision,' Kuney notes, then perhaps California law and
federal common law completely coincided in their treatment of
that license-which would mean the Everex court was creating
an Erie issue where none existed. As Kuney explains, for a
contract that is silent on assignability, "the application of the
state law of assignments might well require that the court look
to the nature of the contract and endeavor to determine
whether the underlying agreement was one where the identity
of the parties was actually critical to maintaining the benefit of
the bargain,"' refusing to allow assignment if it was. Indeed,
California contract law does generally prohibit the assignment
of contract rights when such assignment would "materially
impair the non-assigning party's chance of obtaining the
performance he expected."6 This can be seen as an exception to
the usual rule of reading contractual silence to favor
assignability.'

62 Kuney,

supra note 3, at 627-28.
Recall, to pass the § 365(c)(1) test, the applicable law must bar assignment
with or without the no-assign provision. See Chart 1, supra.
Kuney, supra note 3, at 628.
See, e.g., Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier, 308 P.2d 732, 740-41
(Cal. 1957).
In their 1999 article, Quinn and Weide made a similar point to Kuney's,
arguing that the Everex court did not carefully consider what outcome would have
resulted if California state law had been applied to the license at issue. See Quinn &
Weide, supra note 5, at 1143 ("Neither the Unarco nor Everex court examined what
outcome would result if the law of the forum state were applied. Application of state
law might have resulted in an outcome identical to that arising from application of the
federal rule.").
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It is certainly true that the Everex court did not
sufficiently defend its conclusion that California state law
would ordinarily presume the debtor's license to be assignable
under the facts of the case. The district court below believed
the license would be presumed assignable under California
law, and the Ninth Circuit seems to have accepted this view
with little additional analysis. 7 But the district court based its
conclusion on an overly broad reading of the California
Supreme Court's Doppimaier decision: the court interpreted
Doppimaier to say that "under California law, patent licenses
could be freely assigned,"' which clearly went beyond the
holding of that case.'
Undoubtedly, the reason that neither the Ninth Circuit
nor the district court in Everex considered the issue very
carefully is that both courts ended up holding that, assuming
state law did favor assignability, the federal common-law rule
would trump state law and the bankrupt licensee could not
assign.0 Thus, because the fine points of California state law
were not outcome-determinative, the district court and Ninth
Circuit did not focus on them.
But quarreling with the application of California state
contract law to the particular license at issue in Everex does
nothing to assail Everex's main result: In cases where state law
and federal common law differ on how a patent license should
be treated, federal law wins, even in a post-Erie world. At the
very least, we know there are some circumstances in which
state-law doctrines like California's would presume a patent
license to be assignable. After all, in Dopplmaierthe California
Supreme Court applied California law to a patent license that
was silent on the question of assignability and concluded that
under the circumstances it could be assigned." If the Everex
analysis were correct aside from misconstruing California law
as applied to the particular license at issue in that case, then
67 See Everex, 89 F.3d 673 at 679 (speaking of "state laws, such
as
California's, that would allow assignability").
In re CFLC, Inc., 174 B.R. 119, 121 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
69 In fact, Dopplmaier did not conclude that patent licenses are
always
presumed assignable absent a no-assign provision. Rather, Doppimaier applied the
usual California standard described supra note 65 and the accompanying text, looking
at whether assignment would materially impair the non-assigning party's chance of
getting the performance he expected, and presuming the license to be assignable only if
it would not. Dopplmaier,308 P.2d at 740-41.
70 See In re CFLC, Inc., 174 B.R. at 124 ("The bankruptcy court properly
applied a longstanding rule of federal law.").
71 Dopplmaier,308 P.2d at 741.
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the first time a Dopplmaier-like patent license did find its way
into bankruptcy court (i.e., a license for which state law
followed the pattern shown in the "state-law" row of Chart 2),
the bankruptcy court would run the Everex analysis all over
again, and would reach the same conclusion-and this time it
would be immune from Kuney's critique. In other words,
because Kuney's critique of Everex is limited to the particulars
of how the court applied California state law to the specific
license at issue, it does little to undermine the future influence
of the Everex court's reasoning.
B.

Quinn and Weide's Critique

In their 1999 article, Quinn and Weide articulated a
different critique of Everex." They pointed out that in 1952,
when the Patent Act was voted into law,73 Congress must have
been aware of the various court decisions concerning patent
license assignability, yet it chose not to directly mention patent
licenses anywhere in the Act."' Indeed, even after 1957, when
the California Supreme Court in Dopplmaier held that state
75
contract law governs issues of patent license assignability,
Congress failed to revise the Patent Act to overrule
Dopplmaier. Quinn and Weide interpret this persistent
inaction by Congress as evidence that there is no Everex-style
"federal policy" urging the protection of the patent monopoly in
all cases. If there were, Quinn and Weide reason, Congress
would surely have written protections for patent licenses into
the Patent Act.
But the very same history can be invoked to support the
opposite conclusion. When Congress enacted the Patent Act in
1952, it could have pointed to a century's worth of federal
decisions holding that the federal common-law rule applied to

72

See Quinn & Weide, supra note 5.

73 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2004).
74 See Quinn & Weide, supra note 5, at 1142-43 ("[While Congress was
aware

of the various decisions regarding patent license transferability when it enacted 35
U.S.C. § 261 in the 1952 Patent Act, it did not amend this section to clarify the rights of
a licensee."). It is clear from the context that Quinn and Weide mean that Congress did
not "amend" the various pre-enactment drafts to clarify this issue.
75 Dopplmaier,308 P.2d at 739.
76 See Quinn & Weide, supra note 5, at 1142 (noting that "[tihe fact
that the
particular rights at issue are government granted 'exclusive' rights does not support a
finding that there must be a federal policy which serves to always protect the rights,"
and invoking Congressional inaction to support this).
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patent license assignments." And if there was any doubt about
whether the federal rule had survived Erie, the 1952 Congress
could have looked to the post-Erie Eighth Circuit decision in
Rock-Ola v. Filben (1948), which had re-asserted the federal
rule (though, as noted above, the relevant language appeared
in dicta7'). So, to the extent that the 1952 Congress held any
belief at all about the prevailing law on patent license
assignability, it probably thought that such matters were
already governed by federal common law. Thus, Congress's
failure to mention patent licenses in the Patent Act might be
taken as a sign that it approved of the traditional, federal
common-law treatment of those licenses.
And what of Congress's failure to overrule Dopplmaier?
This, too, admits to a different reading than Quinn and
Weide's. On both occasions when Congress was revising the
relevant section of the Patent Act,7 in 1975 and again in 1982,"
it already would have known about the 1972 decision in
Unarco, clearly stating (and not in dicta this time) that federal
common law controlled
questions
of patent license
assignability, even post-Erie." Here, again, Congress's inaction
can be interpreted as tacit approval of the use of federal
common law, rather than as tacit disapproval, as is urged by
Quinn and Weide. Ultimately, this game of divining meaning
from Congressional silence leads, at best, to a stalemate.
C.

What This Article Adds

This Article distinguishes itself from these previous
efforts to attack Everex in that it meets the Everex opinion on
its own terms. This Article does not quarrel with the Everex
court's skill in applying California state contract law to the
license in question, nor does it take issue with the court's
assertion that there is a federal policy favoring the
preservation of the value of the patent monopoly. Instead, this
17 The federal common-law rule was created in 1852 in Troy
Iron & Nail, and
was repeatedly invoked by federal courts between 1852 and 1952. See, e.g., supra note
38.
18 See Rock-Ola v. Filben, 168 F.2d 919, 922 (8th
Cir. 1948) (noting that the

license at issue explicitly forbade the assignment in question, and thus removing any
need to rely on the federal rule construing contractual silence against assignability).
79 The obvious section in which one would overrule Dopplmaier is § 261 of the
Patent Act, entitled "Ownership; assignment." 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
80 Quinn & Weide, supranote 5, at 1143.
81 Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Kelley Co., 465 F.2d 1303, 1306 (7th Cir. 1972).
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Article assumes that the patent license at issue in the Everex
case would have been presumed assignable under California
law, and takes Everex at its word that federal patent policy has
an interest in maintaining the economic value of the patent
monopoly, even against normal variations in state contract law.
But even if one grants the Everex court these core
assumptions, its opinion is still susceptible to attack. And it is
this critique of Everex on its own terms that is the main project
of this Article. As shown in the next section, Everex's own logic
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that federal common
law should control questions of patent license assignability
post-Erie. To properly draw that conclusion, the Everex court
would first have had to find that licensee bankruptcy was,
empirically, a high-probability event. And neither Everex nor
the existing critiques of the decision have even acknowledged
that such an empirical finding was relevant.
VI.

THE EVEREX COURT'S ERROR

A.

The Court'sFailureto Considerthe Probabilityof
Licensee Bankruptcy

Because Erie was a Supreme Court decision, lower
courts can deviate from Erie's broad proscription against
federal common law only by invoking an exception to Erie
carved out by the Supreme Court itself. The Everex court relied
on a different exception to Erie than the Sola-created exception
that was cited (inappositely) by the Unarco court.' The
exception invoked by the Everex court is one that permits the
use of federal common law in cases where following state law
would significantly conflict with some federal policy.
To establish that exception, the Everex court cited the
Supreme Court case of Lear v. Adkins.' From Lear, the Everex
court drew the proposition that "[t]he construction of a patent
license is generally a matter of state contract law, except where
state law 'would be inconsistent with the aims of federal patent
policy."' ' In a more precise statement of Lear's reasoning, the
Lear Court had explained that "[tihe decisive question [in Lear
was] whether overriding federal policies would be significantly
82 See supra Part 1V.B.
83 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
Everex, 89 F.3d at 677 (citing Lear, 395 U.S. at 661-62, 673, additional
citations omitted).
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frustrated" if state contract law were allowed to control.' As
noted in Part IV.C, when the Everex court applied this
principle, it concluded that federal common law must govern
the assignability of patent licenses "because of the conflict
between federal patent policy and state laws, such as
California's, that would allow assignability."'
At the time of the Everex decision, this same exception
to Erie had been restated by the Supreme Court in at least two
cases following Lear. In O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, a decision also noted with approval in
Everex, the Supreme Court explained that exceptions to the
Erie doctrine are "limited to situations where there is a
'significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and
the use of state law.' 87 And in Boyle v. United Technologies
Corporation,the Supreme Court said that federal judges may
create federal common law when "a 'significant conflict' exists
between an identifiable 'federal policy or interest and the
[operation] of state law . . . ."" On its face, the Everex decision
appears to be a perfectly reasonable implementation of the
"significant-conflict-with-a-federal-policy" exception to Erie
that was articulated in Lear, O'Melveny, and Boyle. But a
closer look reveals an important elision in the Everex court's
reasoning-one that might have led the court to the wrong

result.
The Everex court is saying that if state common law
were to control, many states would (as California has done)
impose a rule favoring assignability--one following the "statelaw" pattern in Chart 2. And under § 365 of the Code, this
would mean that a bankrupt licensee could assign its license to
a third party, even when the license contained a no-assign
provision. Undermining no-assign provisions can clearly reduce
the value of the patent monopoly to its holder. Therefore,
according to Everex, it significantly conflicts with federal policy,
and must be prohibited.
88 Lear, 395 U.S. at 673.
8s Everex, 89 F.3d
at 679.
87 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384
U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
88 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988) (quoting Wallis, 384 U.S. at 68). In
fact, only
O'Melveny is a perfect analog to Lear. Boyle did apply the "significant conflict"
standard, but the Court first determined that the relevant area of law (that of military
contracting) was one of "uniquely federal interest." Therefore, the "significant conflict"
in Boyle did not have to be as significant as it would otherwise have needed to be to
permit the use of federal common law. Id. at 507-08.
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But this logic, straightforward as it seems, overlooks an
important fact: Most patent licensees do not wind up in
bankruptcy, and outside the special context of bankruptcy,
state law gives the very same result as the federal common-law
rule. Outside of bankruptcy, the Code does not apply, and there
is no need to engage in the complex dance of § 365. Whether
one is using state law or federal common law, the no-assign
provision is honored and the licensor is not harmed in the least.
(To see this, notice that the right-hand column of Chart 2 says
"assignment not permitted" under both the federal and state
rules.)
When a court calculates how seriously the use of state
law would impair the incentive to innovate, it must view the
problem from the perspective of the would-be innovator: the
scientist sitting in his laboratory (or, perhaps more
realistically, the R&D director sitting in her office), trying to
decide how much effort, time, or money to invest in a certain
research project. This decision is made long before the
invention is complete, long before the patent is issued, and
certainly long before the inventor learns whether the eventual
licensee of that patent will end up going bankrupt. From the ex
ante perspective of the innovator, the chances may be small
that the licensee will ever declare bankruptcy. And from the
innovator's point of view, it will be only in these rare cases that
the no-assign provision will be undermined by the use of state
law. This small chance of having the no-assign provision
undermined might not reduce the ex ante expected value of the
patent monopoly by very much at all, because it counts for little
in the calculation of the overall average expected value of the
patent. If licensee bankruptcy is very unlikely, then the
innovator's incentive to innovate would scarcely be affected by
this improbable cataclysm.
It is as if the innovator is being promised (by Congress)
the keys to a Rolls Royce if she discovers a useful, new, and
non-obvious technology, and § 365 of the Code, in conjunction
with state contract law, is imposing a one-in-a-thousand chance
that the Rolls Royce the innovator wins will be a lemon. This
small chance of winding up with a worthless Rolls Royce will
scarcely dampen the innovator's incentive to expend effort and
money on her research, because there is still a 999-in-athousand chance that the Rolls Royce will be a "non-lemon."
The Everex court appears to have been lulled into
assuming that all licensees would go bankrupt sooner or later,
just because the particular licensee before the court that day
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happened to have done so. "Allowing free assignability," the
court warned, "would undermine the reward that encourages
invention because ...[iun essence, every licensee would become
a potential competitor ...in the market for licenses . . . ."I But
how is that relevant? The use of state law would not give "every
licensee" the right to freely assign its patent licenses. At worst,
it would only allow bankrupt licensees to do so. Non-bankrupt
licensees must obey no-assign provisions under the state and
federal rules alike, and the would-be innovator must surely
factor these "good outcomes" into her calculation of the ex ante
expected value of the patent.
As an example, suppose that exactly 1% of the nation's
patent licenses are granted to licensees destined for
bankruptcy." In that case, even if undermining a license's noassign provision literally reduced its value to the licensor to
zero (which, of course, it does not), it would still be the case
that applying state contract law rather than federal common
law could not possibly reduce the ex ante expected value of a
patent by more than one part in a hundred.'
Moreover, if our hypothetical assumption is correct that
only 1% of the nation's licenses wind up in the hands of
bankrupt licencees, then the Everex court may be subjecting
the vast majority of licenses to federal common law, thus
stripping from state legislatures and state courts powers that
were supposedly safeguarded by Erie,just to avoid a bad result
in the one-in-a-hundred case where the license ends up in the
possession of a bankrupt licensee. This would be a startling
example of the tail wagging the dog. The point of this Article is
not to claim that only 1% ... or 2%, or 7% ... of the nation's
patent licenses end up being held by a bankrupt licensee. The
point is simply to assert that the Everex court made no finding
89 Everex, 89 F.3d at 679.
® A more complete azalysis would consider not simply the fraction of licenses
whose licensees were expecte.r to declare bankruptcy, but the value-weighted fraction of
licenses whose licensees were expected to do so. For instance, if 1/3 of the licenses were
expected to wind up in the hands of bankrupt licensees, but all of those licenses turned
out to cover nearly worthless technologies, the would-be innovator might not
particularly care. Having one's no-assign provision stripped away by the courts only
hurts if the underlying technology has real value.
91 In fact, while the expected value of the patent cannot decline by more than
one part in 100, the actual value of the patent to the innovator can decline by slightly
more than that. Generally speaking, risk-averse actors are not willing to pay an asset's
expected value to acquire that asset, if the risk of the asset is non-diversifiable, because
these actors will insist on some discount to compensate them for the hardship of
bearing the risk itself. But, if the expected probability of bankruptcy is small, this
correction for the cost of risk-bearing will be small as well.
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at all on this critical empirical question. Had it looked into the
matter and concluded that only a small fraction of patent
licensees do, in fact, go bankrupt, the court's decision might
well have gone the other way, even under the very same legal
analysis.
Another way of viewing the problem is to start with the
Coase Theorem, which says that, under ideal conditions, a
licensee and licensor will choose the contractual terms that
maximize the total economic value of the patent at the time the
license is signed. Thus, if a license contains a no-assign
provision, it is probably because a non-assignable license
preserves more of the patent's total economic value than an
assignable one would have done. And any rule of law that
nullifies no-assign provisions-as long as these provisions
arose out of costless and well-informed bargaining-reduces
the expected economic value of the patent. By nullifying the noassign provision only when the licensee is in bankruptcy, the
use of state law clearly reduces the patent's ex ante expected
value somewhat.' What the Everex court failed to consider is
that it might reduce that value only very slightly, not
"significantly," because licensee bankruptcy may, in fact, be
quite rare.'
As discussed in Part II, the use of state law amounts to a requirement that
the licensor must give the licensee a kind of "bankruptcy insurance" along with the
license. The cost of this insurance will be built into the fee structure of the patent
license, and this will prevent certain otherwise value-creating licensing transactions
from ever occurring. This is another way of saying that many licensees may not wish to
purchase bankruptcy insurance, particularly from a licensor who cannot easily
diversify the risk and is therefore forced to charge high premiums. Indeed, even at a
fair price, this sort of insurance might be particularly unappealing to licensees, since
the benefits of bankruptcy insurance are enjoyed mainly by a company's creditors,
while the "premiums" (the licensing fees) are paid by its shareholders. (In theory the
shareholders could recoup some of the premiums by borrowing on more favorable terms
from exceedingly patent-savvy lenders, who understand that they are buying a bit of
bankruptcy insurance along with their loans. But this seems far fetched.)
One might ask whether this argument fixates unduly on the word
"significant" in the Erie line of cases. Can the notion really be defended that a conflict
between state law and federal policy must surpass some quantitative threshold-that
it must be "significant"-before courts may impose federal common law? In fact, it can:
The "significant conflict" test does impose a meaningful quantitative threshold.
First, in the Supreme Court's statements of the legal standard, the word
"significant" is always used. In Lear, the Court held that "t]he decisive question" is
"whether overriding federal policies would be significantly frustrated" by the use of
state law, and in O'Melveny and Boyle the Court said that federal common law was
permitted when there was a "significant conflict" between federal policy and the use of
state law. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text. Quinn and Weide also
acknowledge that "even assuming a conflict between state law and [the relevant]
federal policy were to exist [in the Everex case], the conflict must be significant in order
to justify displacement of state law." Quinn & Weide, supra note 5, at 1143.
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Robertson v. Wegmann: An Analytical Comparison

The Supreme Court made this same argument in
another context in the 1978 case of Robertson v. Wegmann.'
There, a plaintiff had sued a state district attorney and others
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that his federal civil rights
had been violated under color of state law. Another federal
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, specifically requires that courts use
the common law, constitution, and statutes of the forum state
to fill legal gaps regarding suitable remedies in federal civil
rights actions, except where such state laws are "inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States." 5 Where
they are inconsistent, by implication, federal common law must
be applied. This "inconsistent-with-federal-law" standard might
appear to be at least potentially different from the Everexinvoked standard, which calls for a "significant conflict"
between state law and federal policy." But in Robertson v.
Wegmann, the Supreme Court explained that in looking for
"inconsistencies" between state and federal law, "courts must
The notion of a quantitative threshold also squares with common sense.
The Erie decision created a strong presumption against the use of federal common law,
and the Supreme Court has 'emphasized that federal common law can displace state
law in 'few and restricted' instances." Boyle, 487 U.S. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)). If courts were unwilling to
tolerate even a small conflict between federal policy and the use of state law, they
would find themselves displacing essentially all state laws with federal common law.
For any given state-law doctrine, one can almost always dream up an unlikely set of
events that would render the doctrine inimical to federal policy.
Lastly, the Supreme Court itself has implicitly acknowledged the idea of a
quantitative cutoff. In Boyle, the Court explained that in an area of "uniquely federal
interest" (in this case, military contracting) the Court would still require a "significant
conflict" before imposing federal common law, but noted that "Itihe conflict [of state
law] with federal policy need not be as sharp as that which must exist for ordinary preemption," like the preemption used in Everex. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507. This idea of
different "degrees of sharpness" of the conflict implies that in the "ordinary
preemption" cases, such as Everex, there is some minimum severity threshold for the
conflict. (Otherwise, it is meaningless to say that the cutoff for the uniquely-federalinterest cases is lower.) See also Chapman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 911 F. 2d 267,
269 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[Appellant] vigorously contends, however, that even given the
lesser degree of conflict required for preemption in areas of uniquely federal interest,
the limitation of liability policy expressed in the Act does not pose a 'significant
conflict,' [] with the operation of state law . . . ." (quoting Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507)); Ill.
Psychiatric Hosp. v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9607, *7 (N.D. Ill.)
(applying the standard used in Boyle, and concluding that the use of state law "does not
present a sufficiently significant conflict between federal and state law" to justify the
use of federal common law).
94 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
95 Id. at 587 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
See Everex Sys. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 678 (9th
Cir. 1996).
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look not only at particular federal statutes ... , but also at 'the
policies expressed in [them]. ' "' "Of particular importance," the
Court said, "is whether application of state law 'would be
inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of
action . . .'" created by § 1983.' Thus, the test used by the
Supreme Court in Robertson v. Wegmann turns out to be quite
similar to the "significant-conflict-with-a-federal-policy" test
used in Everex.'
In Robertson v. Wegmann, the § 1983 suit had been
brought in a Louisiana state court. ' The plaintiff had died
before the planned trial, and the executor of his estate had
attempted to continue his civil rights action on the estate's
behalf."' But Louisiana's survivorship statute would have
allowed the suit to go forward only if it had been brought on
behalf of the plaintiffs spouse, children, parents, or siblings,
and no such relatives existed. 2 Thus, the federal cause of
action would have abated with the plaintiffs death unless the
federal courts could impose a federal common-law rule
providing that a § 1983 action survives in favor of the plaintiffs
estate.10°
The Court acknowledged that the federal "policies
underlying § 1983 include compensation of persons injured by
deprivation of federal rights and prevention of abuses of power
by those acting under color of state law."" But in the end, the
Court found that the Louisiana survivorship law, not federal
common law, should control because use of the state statute did
not frustrate these federal policies seriously enough to warrant
the use of federal common law. The Court wrote:
[Gliven that most Louisiana actions survive the plaintiffs death, the
fact that a particular action might abate surely would not adversely
affect § 1983's role in preventing official illegalityO. A state official
contemplating illegal activity must always be prepared to face the
prospect of a § 1983 action being filed against him. In light of this
prospect, even an official aware of the intricacies of Louisiana

Robertson, 436 U.S. at 590 (citations omitted).
8 Id. (citation omitted).
1o
101

'02
103
10,

Everex, 89 F.3d at 678.

Robertson, 436 U.S. at 587.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 591.

Id. at 588.
Id. at 591 (citations omitted).
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survivorship law would hardly be influenced in his behavior by its
provisions."'

The analogy to Everex is clear. Due to the Louisiana
state survivorship rule, a small number of valid civil rights
actions would die with the plaintiff, whereas under federal
common law they would have survived him. The matter before
the Court in Robertson v. Wegmann happened to be one of
those rare cases. 0 ' Thus, it is beyond dispute that the Louisiana
statute reduces the average "cost" of committing a civil rights
violation under color of state law from the perspective of a state
official deciding whether to commit such a violation. But, as the
Robertson v. Wegmann Court observed, because very few
plaintiffs will die before trial leaving behind no spouse, child,
parent, or sibling,"7 the cost of committing such a civil rights
violation-from the ex ante perspective of the state officialwould decline only slightly due to the use of the Louisiana rule.
In the Court's words, "even an official aware of the intricacies
of Louisiana survivorship law would hardly be influenced in his
behavior" by the use of the state rule, because "most Louisiana
actions survive the plaintiffs death ....
This Article has made the same basic point regarding
Everex. The use of state law to decide questions of patent
license assignability does, indeed, reduce the value of the
patent monopoly when the licensee is bankrupt. But if licensee
bankruptcy is relatively rare, then the incentive to innovate,
from the ex ante perspective of the would-be innovator, would
hardly be dampened at all by the use of state law, just as the
incentives of the would-be civil rights violator would scarcely
have been affected by the use of the Louisiana survivorship
rule in Robertson v. Wegmann. Unlike the Supreme Court in
Robertson v. Wegmann, the Ninth Circuit in Everex failed to
address the critical empirical issue of how frequently the
situation arises in which state law conflicts with the relevant
federal policy.
105

Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592.

106

"Happened to be" is perhaps too glib. It is often the unusual, and

doctrinally problematic, case that makes it to court--especially to the federal appellate
courts and the United States Supreme Court. This is one reason why those courts must
be especially careful not to presume that the facts before them are representative of the
general case, as the Ninth Circuit seems to have done in Everex.
107 Robertson, 436 U.S. at 591-92.
108Id. at 592 (emphasis added), quoted at greater length supra text
accompanying note 105.
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THE MORE POWERFUL CRITIQUES OF THIS ARTICLE'S
ARGUMENT

Built into the logic of this Article are some assumptions
about the Erie exception invoked by the Everex court and about
how the court applied that exception to the facts before it. This
Part anticipates two concerns readers might have regarding
these assumptions and shows that they do not undermine this
Article's main argument. This Part also addresses the concern
that the supposed "flaw" in Everex's logic could have been
solved trivially, by tailoring the federal common-law rule more
narrowly, and that it therefore does not point to any need for
an empirical analysis of the probability of licensee bankruptcy,
of the kind called for in this Article.
The Hypothetical Conflict Argument

A.

There is one potential reading of Everex that might, if it
were correct, undermine the thrust of this Article. As we have
seen, the Everex court found that "[a]llowing free
assignability-or, more accurately, allowing states to allow free
licenses
would
assignability-of
nonexclusive
patent
undermine the reward that encourages invention .

. . ."'

The

phrase "allowing states to allow free assignability" suggests
that perhaps the court was not claiming that California state
law would actually create a significant conflict with federal
patent policy, but simply that leaving the matter in the hands
of the states could conceivably pose such a conflict in the
future. To take an extreme example, the California legislature
might someday enact a law declaring that "all contracts are
hereby assignable, regardless of any no-assign provisions they
might contain." Such a hypothetical law would frustrate all noassign provisions in patent licenses, not just those in situations
where the licensee was bankrupt. The "significant conflict"
threshold might well be surpassed under such an extreme rule,
even if it would not have been surpassed under the actual
present-day law of California, which frustrates no-assign
provisions only in cases of licensee bankruptcy."'
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Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th

Cir. 1996).
110 I thank Prof. Barry Adler for pointing out this possible alternative reading

of Everex.
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But there is ample evidence that the Everex court was
not referring to such "hypothetical state law." In particular, the
court concluded its discussion of whether federal common law
should be applied as follows: "Thus, federal law governs the
assignability of patent licenses because of the conflict between
federal patent policy and state laws, such as California's, that
would allow assignability."' The phrase "such as California's"
strongly suggests that the court was thinking of the actual law
of the State of California, not some hypothetical law the state
might enact in the future.
A review of the relevant Supreme Court cases shows
that, in applying the "significant conflict" test, the Court
always focuses on the actual law of the forum state, rather
than hypothetical law. For instance, in Wallis v. Pan American
Petroleum Corp.,"' the lower court had found a significant
conflict between Louisiana state law and the federal policy of
promoting the assignability of certain mineral leases. The
Supreme Court disagreed. "However fitting [the lower court's]
approach may be where a State interposes unreasonable
conditions on assignability," the Court wrote, "it can have no
force in this instance because Louisiana concededly provides a
quite feasible route for transferring any mineral lease .... ""'
Thus, while state law could have hypothetically created a
significant conflict with the federal policy, the use of federal
common law was not warranted in Wallis because the actual
law of Louisiana did not conflict seriously enough with federal
policy to justify such an extreme measure. The test, then, is
whether the actual law of the forum state conflicts significantly
with a federal policy, not whether some future law might do so.
B.

The Argument that Everex May Have Been Addressing a
Larger Universe of Licenses

This Article has focused on the reduction in the value of
the patent monopoly that occurs when the license contains a
no-assign provision which is overridden by the use of state law.
But perhaps Everex can be read more broadly. Consider what
would happen if the license were silent on the issue of
assignability. In that case, the use of state, rather than federal,
law would result in the license being assignable as welli

Everex, 89 F.3d at 679.

112 384 U.S. 63 (1966).
13

Id. at 69-70.
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regardless of whether the licensee was bankrupt. (See Chart 2
to confirm this.) If most patents with such "silent" licenses are,
as an empirical matter, worth more when the law construes
them to be non-assignable, then using state law will reduce the
expected value of these patents on average. The issue then
becomes whether the harm done to the patent monopoly by
nullifying no-assign provisions in bankruptcy, plus the harm
done, both in and outside of bankruptcy, by always construing
"silent" licenses as assignable, combine to create a "significant"
conflict with patent policy overall. The following chart may
help clarify this point.
The Ultimate Outcome on Assignability in Every
Possible Situation Being Considered, Both Inside
and Outside of Bankruptcy

Chart 3:
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In all three shaded regions of Chart 3, state law and
federal common law lead to different results. In the above
discussion, we have focused only on the cross-hatched region,
where an explicit no-assign clause is overridden by the Code.
But when the license is silent on assignability (middle column),
the use of state law might threaten federal policy whether the
licensee is bankrupt or not. It will threaten such policy in cases
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where the parties to the "silent" license, had they thought of it,
would have inserted a no-assign provision. If such cases are
prevalent, then the middle column, on net, will represent a
harm to federal policy. Even if the cross-hatched region alone
did not represent a "significant" conflict with the overall federal
policy (defined over the entire chart), perhaps adding the net
harm from the middle column-i.e., from the silent licenseswould be enough to increase the conflict to above the
"significant" threshold.
As noted, in the middle column the cases in which state
law impairs federal policy are only those where the parties
would have preferred the license to be non-assignable had they
thought of the issue, but where they inadvertently left the
license silent, opening themselves up to the hazards of state
law and the vagaries of future courts' Erie analyses. Thus, as
noted in Part II, it is likely that most of the patents
represented in this middle column were not expected to be very
valuable anyway. (Why else would the parties have left the fate
of their licenses to chance?) Still, the middle column of Chart 3
may cover many more contingencies than the cross-hatched
region: If the cross-hatched region represents a harm to
valuable patents in cases of licensee bankruptcy, the middle
column might represent an insult to lower-value patents over a
much broader range of cases-i.e., whether the licensee is
bankrupt or not. Perhaps these many small insults to federal
policy add up to a net harm large enough not to be drawfed by
the harm found in the cross-hatched region. Perhaps, then, we
must consider these "silent" licenses as well, in determining
whether the overall harm to federal policy is "significant."
In fact, there is language in the district court opinion in
Everex suggesting that the lower court may have been
considering licenses that are silent on assignability in addition
to those with an explicit no-assign provision. In particular, the
district court noted that "[1]imiting assignability to licenses in
which the patent holder expressly agrees to assignment aids
the patent holder in exploiting the patent. ... ";, This certainly
makes it sound as if the district court was considering the
impact of state law on federal policy over the whole range of
possibilities, including "silent" licenses.
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In re CFLC, Inc., 174 B.R. 119, 123 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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But the Ninth Circuit in Everex seems to have focused
primarily on the cross-hatched region of Chart 3, as the
following passage reveals:
As a practical matter free assignability of patent licenses might spell
Few patent holders
the end to paid-up [i.e., flat-fee,] licenses ....
would be willing to grant a license in return for a one-time lump-sum
payment, rather than for per-use royalties, if the license could be
assigned to a completely different company which might make far
greater use of the patented invention than could the original
licensee. 1

This language conveys the impression that the court was
focusing on the harm done to patent holders who knew
beforehand that they wanted to create a non-assignable license,
and who therefore presumably would have inserted a no-assign
provision.
But even if the Ninth Circuit had been thinking of the
harm to federal policy found in all three shaded regions of
Chart 3, the argument of this Article would still hold up. From
the ex ante perspective, the innovator still must assess the
likelihood that the situations described by the three shaded
regions will come to pass in order to assess the expected value
of his patent. And if the Everex court did not opine on the
likelihood of the license ending up in the cross-hatched region,
it certainly did not speculate about the probability of its
landing in any of the three shaded regions. The point remains
the same: The expected value of the patent, from the
perspective of the would-be innovator, is tied to the probability
of some future event or set of events, and a court considering
the problem needs to opine on that probability.1'

1

Cir. 1996).

Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th

16 One might wonder: What does it mean for the would-be innovator to
'assess" the probability that his patent monopoly will be harmed in the middle column
of Chart 3? Surely, if he knows enough to make this assessment beforehand, he would
simply insert the appropriate assignability language into the relevant license, thereby
avoiding the middle column altogether. But would-be innovators do not always assess
the future value of their patents through a formal forecasting process. They may,
instead, become generally aware of the likely value of a patent based on experience and
second-hand reports-journal articles, business-school lectures, and the like. If patent
licenses in the middle column of Chart 3 are frequently interpreted by courts as being
assignable, even though they would have been more valuable as non-assignable
agreements, that information might easily slip into a would-be innovator's appraisal of
the likely value of his own patent, even if the innovator had not thought rigorously
about whether his particular patent would be more valuable if non-assignable.
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The "NarrowTailoring"Point

One might wonder whether this Article's critique of
Everex could have been avoided by a more narrowly tailored
application of federal common law. Suppose the Everex court
had created a federal common-law rule that contractual silence
should be construed against assignability only in cases where
the licensee was bankrupt, leaving state law undisturbed
otherwise. Could we still fault the Everex
court for not opining
1 17
bankruptcy?
licensee
of
on the probability
The answer is yes. Narrow tailoring and the "significant
conflict" requirement are, in reality, separate issues. Even if a
federal common-law rule is narrowly tailored, there remains
the question of whether the insult to federal policy that
occasioned this narrowly tailored rule was "significant," or not,
relative to the overall federal policy-i.e., the federal policy
considered over the entire range of its application. If not, then
the federal rule violates Erie, no matter how narrowly tailored
it may be.
In cases such as Everex, if the probability of licensee
bankruptcy is low, then the effect of state law on the
innovator's incentives would not be significant, and the federal
courts would have no right to rectify this tiny harm by creating
federal common law, even federal common law that is narrowly
tailored. Certainly, if the Everex court had crafted its federal
rule so that it applied only in cases of licensee bankruptcy, that
would have eliminated the "tail wagging the dog" problem
mentioned earlier.'18 I.e., we would not be sweeping aside state
law for all issues of patent license assignability to address a
problem that occurred only when the licensee was bankrupt.
And this might be better than creating an extremely broad
federal rule to address a tiny harm. But cases like Lear,
O'Melveny, and Boyle do not just prohibit the killing of a gnat
with a sledgehammer. They prohibit the killing of an
insignificantly bothersome gnat, by any means.

117 This point was raised by the staff of the Boston University Journal of

Science and Technology Law.
118 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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VIII.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

A.

The Recommended Approach for Courts Faced with
Everex-type Questions in the Future

Undoubtedly courts will continue to confront fact
patterns similar to those found in Everex. It is therefore worth
considering how these future courts might avoid the pitfalls of
the Everex court's reasoning. Any future court faced with such
a problem would likely arrive at the same conclusion we
reached in Part III: bankrupt licensees may assign their
licenses notwithstanding a no-assign provision only if, outside
of the bankruptcy context, questions of patent license
assignability would be governed by state law rather than
federal common law. To determine which of these two bodies of
law applies, the court would have to decide whether there is
any applicable exception to Erie's broad proscription on the use
of federal common law. The obvious candidate would be the
exception invoked by the Everex court, permitting the use of
federal common law when applying state law would
"significantly conflict" with some federal policy. The relevant
federal policy is that of the Patent Act, whose purpose is
spelled out in the Constitution: "To promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts . . . ," i.e., to encourage
innovation."' Thus, only when applying state law would
significantly frustrate the incentive to innovate can one
conclude that state law significantly conflicts with federal
patent policy.
Reasonable judges will differ about how to decide what
constitutes a "significant" conflict with the federally created
incentive to innovate. For instance, one judge might ask, "By
what fraction can state law reduce the expected value of the
patent monopoly before it 'significantly frustrates' efforts to
innovate by would-be patentees?" Another judge might feel that
such subjective questions about how "innovative efforts" might
respond to a given decrease in the value of the patent monopoly
are best left to Congress, not the courts, and that any
significant diminution of the patent's value will "significantly
conflict" with federal policy per se.

119U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 8.
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But whatever approach they take, judges who are
confronted with patent license assignability questions must
necessarily commit to some quantitative cutoff separating the
"significant" conflict with federal policy from the conflict that is
"insignificant." Courts need not settle on any particular
number. They need not, for instance, proclaim that the conflict
with federal policy becomes "significant" when the expected
value of the patent drops by at least 10%, or 15%, or 20%. But
even if the cutoff is an impressionistic one, a cutoff there must
be, because if the expected value of the patent is reduced by a
sufficiently small fraction, the diminishment will not create a
significant conflict with federal policy and the Erie exception
will not apply.
To decide whether the use of state law would push the
patent's expected value below the relevant cutoff, the court
must view the problem from the ex ante perspective of the
would-be innovator. This scientist or R&D director is the true
target of the federal incentive scheme, and therefore all that
matters is his or her subjective appraisal of the likely decrease
in patent value that will be caused by the use of state law.
To get inside the mind of the R&D director, the court
will want to consider at least two empirically determined
quantities. The first has already been discussed at length: the
expected probability of licensee bankruptcy. To estimate that
quantity, the court might look for an average bankruptcy rate
of licensees across all industries, or it may want to use
technology-specific bankruptcy rates. In any case, it would
want to draw on expert testimony from economists who study
innovation and those who study insolvency rates in various
industries.
The second quantity the court should consider is the
expected amount by which the patent's value would change in
the event of licensee bankruptcy. Even in situations where
licensee bankruptcy is relatively likely, if the frustration of the
no-assign provision would reduce the patent's value by only,
say, 20%, then the overall expected value of the patent might
not decline significantly. We have not focused on this second
quantity in the above discussion, mainly because the Everex
opinion did appear to account for it, albeit informally. 0 (It
120The court seemed to feel that the reduction in a patent's value in cases of

licensee bankruptcy would be very large. Compare Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp.
(In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 1996), where the court observed that if
licenses could be assigned at will:
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seems likely that the reduction in the patent's value will be
fairly large in the general case, since a licensee that has
already gone bankrupt will often have to sell the technology at
a low price due to its distressed circumstances, thus providing
stiff competition to the licensor in the market for patent
licenses.)
Of course, the court's estimates of our two quantitiesthe probability of licensee bankruptcy and the expected drop in
a patent's value in the event of such a bankruptcy-will be
subject to the uncertainties that are endemic to all social
science. And, as one can surmise even from this discussion, in
reality the court will have to make some simplifying
assumptions to avoid turning the bankruptcy proceeding into a
kind of government-financed economics colloquium. Still, to
ignore the empirical questions entirely, implicitly assuming
that 100% of the nation's licensees wind up in bankruptcywhich is essentially what the Everex court did-hardly offers
an attractive alternative.
B.

Circumstancesin Which the Problems of Everex Might
Arise in the Future

As we saw in the case of Robertson v. Wegmann, the
analytical framework of Everex is not limited to the problem of
patent license assignability in bankruptcy. The logical errors of
the Everex opinion can arise in many Erie analyses in which
some federal policy applies to an entire range of persons or
situations, at least some of which are ordinarily governed by
state law. Within this range, there is some subset of situations,
"S," in which state law not only applies, but gives a result that
tends to frustrate the federal policy. In Everex, the federal
policy was an incentive policy: The federal government did not
try to implement the desired behavior directly, but instead set
up a system of rewards or punishments intended to motivate
JAlny license a patent holder granted-even to the smallest firm in the
product market most remote from its own-would be fraught with the danger
that the licensee would assign it to the patent holder's most serious
competitor, a party whom the patent holder itself might be absolutely
unwilling to license. As a practical matter, free assignability of patent
licenses might spell the end to paid-up licenses . . . . Few patent holders
would be willing to grant a license in return for a one-time lump-sum
payment, rather than for per-use royalties, if the license could be assigned to
a completely different company which might make far greater use of the
patented invention than could the original licensee.
Id. at 679.
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the targets of the incentive to adopt the desired behaviors on
their own. (The reward offered by the government was the
patent monopoly, and the desired behavior was the invention of
useful technologies.)
In fact, focusing only on such "incentive policies" would
not limit us too severely. A large number of federal policies, on
careful consideration, turn out to be incentive policies. This is
because governments tend to enforce their laws through
imprisonment and forced property transfers, and many
government policies do not identify these two activities as an
ultimately desirable result. For example, one might argue that
the federal government has a policy of reducing the quantity of
cocaine imported into the United States. It expresses that
policy, in part, by imprisoning importers of the drug. The
federal goal is not imprisonment for its own sake, but rather,
the reduction of cocaine imports. In the extreme, if all cocaine
importers happened to have unusual tastes, such that they
preferred incarceration to freedom, then the practice of
imprisoning them would not advance the federal policy at all.
So, the practice of imprisoning drug smugglers is an incentive
to forbear from smuggling drugs, speeding tickets are an
incentive to drive slower, and so on.
Incentive policies can be further broken down into two
groups. In some cases, the target of the federal incentive, at the
moment when he makes the decision that the federal
government is seeking to influence, does not know whether he
falls into subset S or not-i.e., he does not know whether the
use of state law will frustrate the federal incentive in his case.
Everex provides an example of such a situation. When the
innovator is deciding how much effort to expend on her next
invention, she has no idea whether her eventual patent
licensee will end up in bankruptcy.
In these Everex-like scenarios, because the target of the
federal incentive does not know whether she will end up in
subset S or not, she is forced to play the odds. As a result, it is
not just those who will eventually end up in S that see their
incentives dampened. Every person subject to the incentive
scheme will experience a watering-down of her expected
punishment or reward, proportional to her own subjective
assessment of her probability of falling into S. The Erie
question, then, will turn on whether this partial dampening of
incentives, experienced by all targets of the federal policy, is
enough to create a "significant conflict" with the federal
incentive policy overall. In other words, one must somehow
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determine "by how much" the behavior of the incentive targets
will deviate from what it would have been under an incentive
scheme unburdened by state law. This is not just an elaborate
way of restating the problem of patent license assignability in
bankruptcy. As we saw in Part VI.B, the same logic also
applied to the facts of Robertson v. Wegmann, and it would
presumably apply to myriad other situations as well.1 '
The second group of incentive policies are those in which
the target of the incentive does know, at the moment of
decision, whether he is in S or not. The individual may be in
some special category of persons who are covered by the state
law that impairs the federal policy. In what is perhaps the
most common case, S would simply comprise the persons or
activities that are subject to the laws of particular statesthose states that follow the state-law doctrine which dampens
the federal incentive.
For instance, suppose the federal government institutes
a program under which it intends to finance the construction of
small airports in rural areas to encourage commercial activity.
The federal government implements its policy by entering into
numerous contracts with private real-estate developers around
the country, under which each developer will build an airport
and develop the surrounding land to accommodate business
travelers. The federal statute authorizing this program
specifically provides that each contract must contain a clause
under which the developer promises to insure that the land
around the airport will not be used for any purpose that would
create a "hazard to air traffic.""2 This serves as a powerful
disincentive, because, if anyone is injured or killed flying into
one of these airports due to a hazardous land use, the injured
parties and their survivors could sue the relevant developer for
damages. Suppose, however, that in four of the 50 states,
121

In Robertson v. Wegmann, the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged the

potential significance of the fact that the target of the federal incentive did not know
whether she would fall into S at the moment of decision:
In order to find even a marginal influence on [the civil-rights violator's]
behavior as a result of Louisiana's survivorship provisions, one would have to
make the rather farfetched assumption that a state official had both the
desire and the ability deliberately to select as victims [of civil-rights
violations] only those persons who would die before conclusion of the § 1983
suit (for reasons entirely unconnected with the official illegality) and who
would not be survived by any close relatives.
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 592 n.10 (1978).
122 These facts are loosely adapted from the facts of the well-known case of
Miree v. DeKalb, 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
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ordinary contract law prevents such third-party beneficiaries of
a contract from suing on the contract. In those states, the
injured persons can sue only in tort, and must show actual
negligence by the developer, which is far harder to prove than
the "hazardous" use of the land. Developers in those four states
clearly fall into what we have been calling the subset S. They
know from the outset that they will not be strongly affected by
the "hazard to air traffic" clause. (We are assuming that the
contracts are governed by local law under valid choice-of-law
principles.) The incentives of developers in the four problematic
states are seriously dampened as they decide how the land is to
be used, and the incentives of developers in other states are not
dampened at all, because they know that they can be sued by
third-party beneficiaries under applicable contract law.
In fact, this is the hallmark of the second category of
"incentive policy" cases: The federal incentive is diminished
with 100% probability for certain target persons (those who fall
into the subset S) and is not diminished at all for all other
persons. To do the Erie analysis in such cases, one must figure
out whether the dampening of federal incentives in certain
circumstances only is enough to create a "serious conflict" with
the federal policy overall-i.e., as defined over all
circumstances to which the policy is relevant. In the above
example, if the four states with the unusual contract doctrines
happen to be ones where few federally funded airports are
being built, then the overall policy may not be "significantly"
threatened by the application of state law. On the other hand,
if nearly all of the planned airports are to be built in those four
states, the federal policy is in danger of being utterly
undermined.
Finally, one can encounter federal policies that cannot
be described as "incentive policies" at all. These are policies in
which the government's ultimate goal is accomplished by the
direct action of the government itself, not by private actors
motivated by government-provided rewards or punishments.
For example, suppose the federal government is seeking to
impose a nationwide tax that relies on some characterization
that is a creature of state law: lawful title to certain property,
say, or an individual's marital status. Alternatively, one can
envision myriad direct federal expenditures that interact with
state law. Consider, for instance, the rule under which
federally insured student loans are denied to ex-felons. Some
states might adopt a particularly lenient definition of a
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"felony," frustrating the federal government's apparent desire
to avoid educating people who have committed certain crimes.
In such situations, there is no "incentive." The federal
government has pronounced some policy pertaining to its own
direct action, and that action is being muted or frustrated in
some way by variations in state law. Such policies do not need
to be bifurcated according to whether the "incentive target"
knows he will fall into the subset, S, of cases where state law
frustrates federal policy, because there is no "incentive target."
Rather than bifurcate these cases, one analyzes them all alike:
by looking at the whole universe over which the federal policy
is defined, and accounting for the fact that this policy will be
frustrated with 100% certainty in some subset S of that
universe and not frustrated, with equal certainty, in the
remainder. Thus, the analysis resembles that of the second
group of cases we considered: the cases of incentive policies in
which the target of the incentive knows at the moment of
decision whether he will be in S or not. "
In each of the three types of cases just discussed (the
two types of incentive policies and the non-incentive policies),
courts may be tempted to repeat the error of Everex, by
focusing narrowly on the circumstances of the litigants before
them, rather than the effects of state law on the relevant
federal policy over the whole range of possible circumstances to
which such policy applies. The fact that Everex involved an
incentive policy, in which the target of the incentive had to
make her decision before knowing whether she would fall into
the subset S, only adds an extra layer of technical difficulty to
the court's Erie analysis. The basic idea of the analysis is the
same for each of the three cases just described.

123In Part VI.B, the civil-rights case of Robertson v. Wegmann was analyzed

as an illustration of an Everex-like incentive policy. But recall that the Supreme Court
in that case said that the federal policy underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1983 included
'compensation of persons injured by deprivation of federal rights" in addition to
"prevention of abuses of power" by state officials. See supra note 104 and accompanying
text. Although the policy of preventing future violations is undoubtedly an incentive
policy, the policy of compensating victims is not. This "compensatory" policy is more
akin to the third category of policies discussed just above: the non-incentive policies.
(That the compensatory policy is not an incentive policy is clear from the fact that one
could fully compensate victims of civil-rights violations out of a federally funded
"discrimination insurance fund," thus completely vindicating the compensatory policy
without discouraging future civil-rights violations at all.)
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Larger Implications of the ErrorsFound in Everex

The missteps of the Everex opinion should concern us, as
an initial matter, simply because Everex is an important case.
As this Article has argued, Everex is the most authoritative
decision in existence concerning the issue of patent license
assignability in bankruptcy, and patent licenses are often
among a bankrupt company's most valuable resources. If
Everex was wrongly decided, other courts should know about it,
so that they do not simply follow the logic of Everex, including
its failure to account for the probability of licensee bankruptcy.
But as we have just seen, Everex's shortcomings may be
emblematic of a larger problem. Whenever a court applies the
"substantial-conflict-with-a-federal-policy" exception to the Erie
doctrine, it must always assess the degree to which the
application of state law frustrates the relevant federal policy,
and in doing this, it must be careful to consider the effects on
the federal policy over the entire range of fact patterns to which
it applies, not just to some subset of those cases. In particular,
the court must take its focus off of the case before it, because
the litigants who happen to be before the court may fall into
some special category for which the application of state law is
particularly inimical to federal policy. If they do fall into such a
category, then focusing narrowly on the facts before the court
may lead to the over-proliferation of federal common law.
Courts, like other organs of government, will often err
on the side of expanding their own power in close cases. It is
probably no coincidence that the four federal circuit courts that
have considered the patent license assignability issue since
Erie all concluded that federal common law should control,
whereas the Supreme Court of California, a state court, came
to the opposite result (in Dopplmaier). Cases such as Everex
provide judges with a tempting opportunity to expand their
power, by inviting them to focus narrowly on the case at hand,
rather than looking at the federal policy overall.
Even if that is true, one might say, why should we really
care if federal courts stretch the meaning of Erie a bit, leading
to a few unwarranted exceptions to Erie's presumption against
federal common law? We should care for at least two reasons.
First, there is the preservation of separate spheres of power for
the legislature and judiciary that lies at the core of our
government's design. Federal judges are appointed officials,
with unique powers to act coercively in individual cases, and as
a result we limit their law-making power to the interpretation
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of existing federal statutes and the federal Constitution. More
freewheeling creation of new laws is better done by legislators,
for any number of reasons, including the facts that (i)
legislators need to be re-elected and will therefore avoid
enacting rules with vastly unpopular effects, (ii) legislators
have much broader powers to investigate the potential effects
of a proposed rule on parties who may not be before them, and
(iii) legislators have the freedom to wait until the effects of a
proposed rule are well understood before acting, while judges
are forced to act speedily in the context of a particular ongoing
dispute. Of course, these reasons only apply when the state law
in danger of being overridden by federal common law is of
legislative, rather than judicial, origin.
A second problem with the unwarranted promulgation
of federal common law-one that applies regardless of whether
the state law being eclipsed is judicial or legislative in originis that federal common law puts an end to state-by-state
experimentation in how the law approaches certain social
problems or goals. Where Congress has remained silent on an
issue within its law-making power, this may be because
Congress could not think of a particular approach that it
considered superior to all others. One way to find out which
approach works best-and, indeed, to find out whether the best
solution involves myriad approaches in different geographic
regions-is to cede control to state legislatures and state courts
and see what emerges. If such state-by-state experimentation
eventually points to a clearly superior approach, or reveals the
need for nation-wide uniformity, Congress can act at that time.
In a contract issue such as the one under consideration
in Everex, it might be said that state-by-state experimentation
is particularly valuable. If various states take diverse
approaches to an issue, the parties to the contract can choose
the approach that best suits them, by agreeing that the law of
State X or State Y will govern their contract. Choice-of-law
principles will not always permit the parties to select their
favorite state-law doctrine of the 50 available, but the parties
will certainly have a wider array of choices under the state-bystate approach than they would if they were forced to follow a
single federal rule."
124
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(setting forth general principles dictating when the parties to a contract can choose the
state-law doctrine under which their contract will be construed).
Note that the Everex court put a stop to state-by-state experimentation not
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With regard to Everex itself, it is worth noting that we
really do not know what would occur if states were left to
create their own law of patent license assignability. As
discussed supra at note 34, the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts leaves room for state courts to deny assignability in
the face of contractual silence whenever assignment of the
contract would "materially increase the burden or risk imposed
on [the obligor] by his contract, . . . or materially reduce its

value to him."125 This language seems sufficiently flexible that it
might allow courts to deny the assignability of patent licenses
that are silent on the issue of assignability, in situations where
assignment would significantly diminish the overall value of
the licensor's patent monopoly. The Restatement (Second) also
bars assignments that are "inoperative on grounds of public
policy." 2 Thus, some state courts might be able to construe a
license as non-assignable by invoking the very same patent
policy that underlies Everex, without any help from federal
common law.
It is certainly not the position of this Article that issues
of patent license assignability should be left to the states. If
federal displacement is needed to prevent some significant
conflict between state law and patent policy, then federal law
should apply. But federal courts that consider the issue in the
future should give the "significant conflict" question a fair
hearing-including a frank assessment of the probability of
licensee bankruptcy-before deciding to eclipse state law in
favor of their own.

just in cases of licensee bankruptcy, where one might say the Code expresses a federal
policy of overriding the parties' choice of law on assignability issues, but also in cases
where the licensee is not bankrupt.
125 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2) (1979).
121 Id. at § 317(2)(b).

